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Secession and Liberal Equality 




Liberal egalitarianism can offer two distinct perspectives on the morality of secession 
from a liberal state. One is permissive. The other is quite restrictive. This essay offers a 
defence of the latter variant, which is often called Just-Cause theory. On this view, 
secession can only be morally justified as a means to rectify past grievances on the part of 
the secessionist group. Secession must have a just cause. If none can be found, then the 
territorial sovereignty of a state that upholds liberal democratic rule cannot be thwarted. 
According to the rival position – Choice-theory – secession can be justified even in the 
absence of any injustice. This more permissive view on state breaking is expected to 
follow from valuing freedom of political association. I demonstrate how both approaches 
can be developed from central commitments of liberal egalitarian morality. These 
commitments often come into conflict. And the case of political divorce is no exception. 
A liberal theory of secession must therefore be at pains to come up with the best possible 
balancing of important, yet incongruous, commitments. In that respect, I argue that the 
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The word secession brings two intuitive associations to mind. Firstly, and perhaps most 
obvious, the venture of political divorce may represent liberation. Consider the persistent 
secessionist group, which for decades has fought an oppressive and rights-violating state: 
To see it secede would certainly exude a profound sense of liberty. Secession is the 
breaking of chains. It enhances freedom. Clearly, this sounds laudable. 
The other association may strike a less happy chord. Consider a liberal democratic 
state, in which a group of people have come to believe that they are better off on their 
own: Whatever has come to estrange them (from the other citizens) is not sought 
reconciled collectively; instead, the separatist option is pursued. So, as secessionists, rather 
than pressing ourselves to pursue democratic politics as the ultimate means of 
reconciliation and accommodation of difference, we quite simply quit the game. But do 
we have a right to quit in that way? The laudability of secession may somehow appear to 
vitiate. 
Clearly, it does not require much reflection to identify a morally relevant difference 
between these two examples. If secession is the most appropriate means to escape 
tyrannical government, then the burden of proof will fall heavily on those who seek to 
justify resistance to the divorce. This, I think, is rather clear-cut. But what if a state has 
not inflicted any harmful policies upon its citizens? On the contrary, what if it has been 
persistent in securing liberal democratic rule, and still does. Is a secessionist movement 
within such a state entitled to secede? This essay will pursue an answer to that question. 
And it will do so from the perspective of liberal egalitarian morality. 
Liberal egalitarianism is complex. The liberal canon is rich and nonmonolithic, and 
this complexity is largely due to a tension that resides within the concept of liberty. 
Interestingly, this tension may vindicate a permissive as well as a restrictive approach to 
what I will call liberal-to-liberal secession. (This term denotes that both mother-state and 
secessionist group are liberal in outlook; they are committed to maintain (in the case of 
the former) or establish (in the case of the latter) a polity with liberal institutions.) I 
  
2 
delimit the theme of this essay to concern this category of divorce only. Thus, from 
hereon, when speaking of ‘secession’ or ‘a right to secede’, I will solely be referring to 
instances in which a group of liberal secessionists seek divorce from a liberal state.  
Why is this delimitation interesting? Let me name one very good reason. A 
discussion of liberal-to-liberal secession has the potential for clearly exposing the topical 
tension within liberal morality. To elaborate: When we consider secession from liberal 
states, the concept of political divorce may still signify a liberating venture. And the 
promotion of liberty rings intuitively laudable to liberals. However, in this context it may 
also be plausible to regard secession as morally unjustified, as long as the mother-state 
rules according to certain standards of good government. The reason is simple: The value of 
political divorce may now, in some sense, be reduced, and because state breaking 
potentially violates other crucial liberal commitments, then it should – on balance – be 
restricted.  
 
1.1 More on Delimitation and Concepts 
It is important to clarify that the theme of this essay is the morality of unilateral secession. 
This is different from consensual secession, in which both parties agree to the split. Further, 
I am concerned with discussing the liberal grounds for recognizing a claim-right to secede, 
which, in Hohfeldian terms, denotes that the granting of such a right places a 
corresponding duty on the part of the mother-state to abstain from attempts to preclude 
the divorce1. Moreover, a liberal state is understood as a polity that acts in accordance with 
the demands of liberal morality. In practice, that entails respecting and upholding a 
comprehensive set of liberal rights. (I will elaborate on what that requires as the essay 
unfolds) Further, I only consider liberal states that are well established, which is to say that 
their institutions are thoroughly consolidated; they have been stable and well-functioning 
for a long time. 
During the last decades the number of published studies on the morality of 
secession has increased dramatically. Several positions claim to be of the liberal kind, but 
they are not all equally entitled to that characterisation. In this essay I will consider the 
                                                 
1 The American legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld (1964) clarified the concept of a ‘claim-right’, which he identified as 
one out of four forms of right. It has the following form: “A has a claim that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ” 
(Wenar 2006: Section 2.1).  
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two perspectives that most naturally attire in liberal draperies. These are the so-called Just-
Cause- and Choice-approaches. As will become clear, they can both be developed from 
fundamental liberal commitments, and, accordingly, appear as good candidates for a 
proper liberal theory of secession.  
My discussion is delimited by leaving out the Nationalist-approach. That approach 
regards a group’s so-called ‘ascriptive’ characteristics (i.e. being a nation or a people, 
sharing a common ethnicity or an encompassing culture, etc.) as factors of utmost moral 
importance, and which (may) ground a unilateral right to secede (Buchanan 1997: 38) 2.  
My delimitation does not imply that the other two perspectives are the dominant 
contemporary voices in the debate on secession. On the contrary, to say that the 
Nationalist-approach is equally dominant would be to state things mildly3. My 
delimitation rather signifies that the liberal credentials of the Nationalist perspective on 
secession are controversial. Indeed, the whole so-called “liberal-nationalist” venture, 
which has caught on in contemporary political philosophy, is highly disputed (in some 
quarters) as a profound liberal project4. It is out of sensitivity to this dispute that I will 
abstain from addressing Nationalist-theories of secession. 
 
1.2 A Note on Methodology 
An important part of doing moral theory is to address the question of how one’s 
normative position can be justified. Our beliefs must be grounded. We want to provide a 
rationale for why the prescriptions advocated by our theory have moral force: Why is it so 
that we ought to follow these prescriptions? The enterprise of moral reasoning thus 
naturally entails making epistemological assumptions. Epistemology is the study of how 
we can come to know things. And in the sphere of moral theory, this naturally centres on 
how normative relevance can be shown. There are two especially influential approaches to 
that effect. These are foundationalism and coherentism (Jamieson 1991: 480).  
                                                 
2 These approaches go under different denominations in the literature. Norman (2006: Chapter 6), for one, uses the 
same terminology as I do. The Just-Cause approach is often referred to as ‘Remedial Right Only’ theories, whereas 
the Choice-approach is sometimes deemed as a ‘Primary Right’ theory of secession. To be more precise, the latter 
category contains two versions, the ‘Plebiscitary’ (which is equal to the Choice-approach) and the ‘Ascriptivist’ 
(which corresponds to Nationalist-theories). See e.g. Buchanan (2006; 1997). Margaret Moore (2006: 59) offers yet 
another terminology for the two latter approaches: ‘Individual autonomy’ and ‘collective autonomy’, respectively.  
3 For an excellent anthology on the Nationalist-approach, which includes contributions from both its partisans and 
opponents, see Moore (ed.) (1998). 
4 For examples of the liberal-nationalist position, see e.g. David Miller (1995) and Will Kymlicka (1995). For a 
powerful critique, see Barry (2001). Tan (2004) provides a somewhat reconciliatory attempt. 
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In the foundationalist mode of justification, moral force is conferred upon beliefs 
by grounding them in a set of foundational principles, which themselves are regarded as 
self-evidently justified. Dale Jamieson puts it as follows: 
 
Foundationalism is (roughly) the view that systems of belief are justified in virtue of the logical relations 
that obtain between beliefs that require justification, and other beliefs that themselves are in no need of 
justification (1991: 480).    
 
The following may illustrate the structure of a foundationalist process of justification5: In 
our daily life we often make moral judgments. If we are witnessing, say, an unprovoked 
physical assault on a person, we may intuitively judge that act as morally wrong. Perhaps 
we focus on the empirical fact that the victim had not in any way (at least as far as we 
could instantly estimate) posed a threat to the physical integrity of the attacker. This 
feature of the situation may appear to us – by way of “gut-feeling” – as morally relevant. 
We are thus (somehow) urged to deem the attack as immoral.    
If we are then asked to justify that specific judgment, we may point to a more 
general rule, which says, “It is wrong to physically assault a person who has done nothing 
to provoke such an act”. What we do here is to seek justification by reference to a higher 
level of generality. One may, however, object that our stated rule itself is in need of 
justification. If so, the process is forced on. The rule can be grounded in one or more 
ethical principles. This can be, for instance, some expression of the Liberal Harm Principle, 
which, to put it bluntly, “prohibits one […] from wrongfully setting back another’s 
interests” (Wellman 2005: 12, n. 9).  
Ethical principles themselves may in turn be justified by reference to a full-fledged 
ethical theory, which may include several principles, and perhaps an explicit statement of 
their priority. At this (ultimate) level of justification we may also find metaethical claims, 
which, rather than discussing “what actually is right and wrong, […] [are] concerned with 
the meaning and significance of calling something right or wrong” (Harrison 2005: 588-9). 
Put differently, metaethics addresses the nature of morality itself. 
 So, foundationalism holds that it is possible to justify a normative assertion by 
referring to one of higher generality. The process of justification ends when we have gone 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Beauchamp (1991: 85-6). 
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from the most particular beliefs to the most general ones. The latter are accordingly 
assumed to be self-evident. It is sensible to describe this approach as a top-down 
justification.  
The other dominant approach to justification, coherentism, does not conduct 
justification solely in that direction. Instead it goes back and forth in (continuous) search 
for coherence between beliefs of various generality. Coherentism has found its most 
influential expression in John Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (cf. Rawls 1951; 1999).  
Rawls’s point of departure is the coherentist view of truth, which claims that true 
statements are hallmarked by them fitting logically together (or cohering) with other 
statements (Wyller 1997: 176). Thus, all levels in the justificatory process are 
simultaneously justified by virtue of their coherence. And only so, holds the coherentist, can 
beliefs be justified. This marks her position as clearly distinct from that of the 
foundationalist, which, to reiterate, holds that “some beliefs, those that are foundational, 
are justified independently of their relations to other beliefs” (Jamieson 1991: 482). 
To elaborate, the coherentist acknowledges that normative assertions can be of 
different generality. The crucial point is that none of these beliefs are sacrosanct. They 
can all be modified. Most interestingly, (even) ethical foundational principles can be 
altered for the sake of placing them in equilibrium with conflicting judgments of lower 
generality. In Rawls’s own words: 
 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the [principles], at others withdrawing our judgments and 
confirming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall [reach] [t]his state of affairs I refer to as 
reflective equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation. 
[…] But this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further examination [of 
judgments and principles]. Yet for the time being we have done what we can to render coherent and to 
justify our convictions of social justice (1999: 18).  
 
Rawls claims that usage of the method of reflective equilibrium may render a discussion 
of metaethical issues – e.g. the debate on ethical cognitivism and emotivism – superfluous 
to the justificatory process (Wyller 1997: 176). This is interesting. To elaborate, consider 
the following passage by Rawls: 
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[T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, not on the question of whether ideal value 
entities exist or whether moral judgments are caused by emotions or whether there is a variety of moral 
codes the world over, but simply on the question: does there exist a reasonable method for validating and 
invalidating given or proposed moral rules and those decisions made on the basis of them? (Rawls 
1951:177) 
 
Not surprisingly, on Rawls’s view, his own method constitutes such a reasonable one. 
Thus, if so, when utilizing the method of reflective equilibrium, the scope of the 
justificatory process can be delimited by leaving out metaethical considerations.  
This thesis will also be methodologically delimited in that way. I will not discuss 
any beliefs above those of the ethical principles of liberalism6. Note, however, that this is not 
for the Rawlsian reason. Instead: Because I am concerned with exploring how liberal 
morality can accommodate a right to secede, it is not necessary to discuss how liberal 
principles themselves can be justified. My theoretical discussion will simply be conducted 
within the confines of liberal morality. Put differently, I am not concerned with the 
justification of liberal principles, but rather with whether these principles can justify a right to 
secede.  
So, I will be at pains to convince liberal egalitarians that the theory I put forward is 
consistent with their morality. And, further, that it constitutes the best possible approach 
to the morality of secession (under the liberal position). Thus, as my theory will in this 
sense be grounded within liberal egalitarianism, its justification will be apparent to those 
who already endorse liberal morality. Consequently, my methodological approach can be 
regarded as largely foundationalist.  
On the other hand, as intimated earlier, due to the complexity of liberal egalitarian 
morality, the liberal theorist must navigate among incongruous ethical commitments, and 
eventually sanction the vindication of some and the sacrifice of others. Tensions must be 
handled. Specifications must be made. This implies that my theory of secession cannot 
accommodate all liberal beliefs. Instead it will have to compromise some for the sake of 
                                                 
6 I will, however, comment briefly on liberal moral ontology, and its view on what it takes for a social entity to 
qualify as a moral agent. This is done in Chapter 2, in relation to the issue of liberalism’s compatibility with the 
concept of a group right.  
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obtaining a coherent position. My methodological approach may thus, in that simple sense, 
bear some resemblance to Rawlsian reflective equilibrium7.  
In the end, however, I regard the justification of my position as done by reference 
to its substantive prescriptions for secession, and their derivation from liberal egalitarian 
foundational principles. It is the validity of these principles that ultimately confer 
normative force onto my theory, not (merely) that it constitutes a coherent position (as it, 
however, hopefully does).  
So, the concessions that will be made are not effected for the sake of obtaining 
justification (through coherence). They are simply necessary to obtain a coherent liberal 
position, in which the chosen concessions constitute what I find to be the mildest 
possible sacrifice of liberal foundational principles. It is thus my belief that liberal 
egalitarians will approve these imperative concessions, and that my theory will be 
regarded as properly grounded in their political morality.      
Now, the following should be clear from this brief sketch of moral justification: 
The theory I develop in this essay claims to be justified within a certain normative 
position. It is thus not exempted from external criticism (nor internal, for that matter). 
On the contrary, liberalism (as goes for any morality) can (and indeed should) be 
contested by rival ethical principles and theories. Clearly, my liberal theory of secession 
remains to be defended from such rivalling perspectives. To provide such a defence, 
however, must be a task for another occasion.  
Before I put this brief outline to a close, let me emphasize that the two approaches 
to justification that I have presented here are not without their problems. To address 
these properly would require a vast amount of additional space. I will nonetheless 
mention a couple: Even though descriptive foundationalism is rather (but not wholly) 
uncontroversial in most quarters, the idea that some beliefs can be self-evident in the 
sphere of morality is much more disputed (Jamieson 1991: 481)8. This problem would of 
                                                 
7 To be precise, it bears resemblance to the method of narrow reflective equilibrium, in which principles and 
judgments (that are contained in the equilibrium, e.g. liberal ones) are not encountered by criticism from alternative 
moral perspectives. In contrast, in the method of wide reflective equilibrium, rival ethical principles are taken into 
account (Daniels 2003: Sections 3.1-2). This distinction is not explicitly drawn in Rawls’s initial depictions of the 
method; it is, however, emphasised in his later work Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (see Rawls 2001: Paragraphs 10.1-
4).   
8 Dale Jamieson elaborates by providing the following example of a descriptive belief: “My belief that there are such 
things as beliefs may be an example of a self-justifying belief, for it is true in virtue of my believing it to be true 
(although some would deny even this). It is a long way from this kind of self-justifying belief, however, to an 
interesting moral theory” (1991: 481). 
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course strike my theory with full power if its justification were claimed to apply outside 
liberal morality. Due to the topical conditionality of my argument, however, I can leave 
out any further considerations about foundationalism and truth-claims.    
In response to coherentism, it has been pointed to the following impalpable 
implication: The method of reflective equilibrium could yield immoral positions if applied 
by people with immoral views – for instance if used by the Nazis. This can be viewed as 
“an instance of an old problem for coherence theories: there can be an indefinite number 
of sets of beliefs in reflective equilibrium, yet there may be no reason to suppose that any 
of these constitute a true theory” (ibid.: 482). So, because coherentism allows for revision 
at all justificatory levels, a theory might no longer be a liberal one if too many liberal 
beliefs are abandoned. Indeed, the method of reflective equilibrium puts a genuinely 
liberal outcome in jeopardy, in a way that foundationalist justification does not. A theory’s 
liberal character will therefore have to be decided after hand, by assessing its substantial 
content.  
I will now bring this first chapter to a close with a brief presentation of the 
chapters to come. 
 
1.3 The Essay in Outline 
Chapter 2 provides a preliminary account of how foundational commitments of liberal 
egalitarian morality apply to the issue of secession. I first argue that the notion of a group 
right is compatible with liberal moral ontology. I then go on to demonstrate how two 
incongruous conceptions of liberty, to which liberals are equally committed, may yield 
two alternative and rival perspectives on secession. Most importantly, these two 
perspectives offer different views on the justification of political power. Secession is the 
taking of territory. A right to secede must therefore include a valid claim to territory. The 
secessionists must be justified wielders of political power. 
 The ‘negative’ conception of liberty is focused on freedom from external 
restrictions. In its ultimate form this notion of liberty applies to the issue of justification. 
It yields an intuitive expression of the liberal idea of popular sovereignty, which holds that a 
social arrangement is unjustified unless it is made acceptable to each person who is to live 
under it. Thus, popular sovereignty seemingly forms a prima facie case in favour of 
secession, grounded in a presumption of political liberty. 
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 On the ‘positive’ conception of freedom we are not truly free unless we live under 
conditions (i.e. freedom of expression, freedom of the press, compulsory education, etc.) 
that enable us to continuously scrutinize our current ends. This is held to be an objective 
interest on the part of each person. This mode of thought can be extended to yield a 
liberal commitment to fixed standards of good government. These standards (e.g. democracy) 
are absolute. Popular sovereignty cannot dismantle them. A presumption of justified political 
power is thus raised on the part of polities that rule in accordance with these standards. 
This forms a prima facie case against secession from such states.  
The ideas of popular sovereignty and fixed standards of good government seem to 
stand in an incongruous relationship. Still, liberal morality is committed to both of them. I 
therefore suggest that a proper liberal theory is hallmarked by it being one in which the 
tension between these two commitments is brought along as far as possible. That is, if one of 
the two perspectives on secession is able to go far in (1) honouring both commitments, 
then a presumption is raised in favour of that perspective as the best liberal approach to 
secession. To thwart that presumption, the rival approach must (2) provide a rationale for 
why matters – all-things-considered – should be otherwise. This is what I call the two-fold 
Tension-Requirement. 
Chapter 3 will elaborate on the Just-Cause approach to secession, which is 
grounded in the presumption of justified political power. I demonstrate how this 
perspective can largely accommodate the tension between popular sovereignty and fixed 
standards of good government. It thus partially fulfils the Tension-Requirement. 
Accordingly, the Just-Cause approach is presumptively vindicated as the proper liberal 
theory of secession. Chapter 3 also contains a brief discussion of the relevant factors that 
may ground a secessionist right under this approach.  
 In Chapter 4 I explore (the most plausible version of) the rival liberal perspective. I 
discuss a recent Choice-theory courtesy of Christopher H. Wellman. Wellman’s theory is 
likewise capable of (going some way in) satisfying the first part of the Tension-
Requirement. This creates a more level playing field between the two liberal perspectives. 
So, to vindicate their own approach as the best liberal theory of secession, both sides will 
have to submit (further) arguments to that effect. The second part of the Tension-
Requirement must be fulfilled.  
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So, the partisans of Just-Cause theory are forced to sharpen their arguments. I 
suggest, however, that they can so do. It is possible to develop a liberal argument from 
‘securing the legitimate interests of the nonsecessionists’, which demonstrates that the 
secessionist demands for self-rule should be accommodated by way of granting intra-state 
autonomy arrangements. If this argument goes through, then Wellman’s theory is 
incapable of fulfilling the second part of the Tension-Requirement. (His own arguments 
to that latter effect are found to be deficient.) The presumption in favour of Just-Cause 
theory as the proper liberal approach to secession is thus restored.  
In Chapter 5 I develop a novel contra-secession argument that further vindicates 
the Just-Cause approach. The argument from ‘plurality’ adds leverage to the liberal 
egalitarian case against the permissive Choice-perspective, by demonstrating how liberal 
morality confers value to societal pluralism. If secession entails a reduction in diversity, 
then the argument from plurality strengthens the case in favour of intra-state autonomy 
solutions to the secessionist conflict.  
In Chapter 6 I summarize my findings, and point to how they may influence future 
research on the morality of secession.  
12 
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In this chapter I will outline the political morality of liberal egalitarianism. This is the 
foundation from which I will develop a theory of secession from a liberal state. First I will 
briefly address the assertion that liberalism cannot theoretically accommodate the 
ontological possibility of group rights. I will argue that this is not the case. In the main 
part of the chapter I spell out the foundational commitments of liberal egalitarianism. I 
argue that the issue of secession demonstrates how these commitments stand in a 
somewhat incongruous relationship. The tension between them gives rise to two rival 
presumptions – one in favour of and one in disfavour of – a right to secede. Both must 
be taken seriously, and they can be viewed as diametrically opposed starting points for a 
theory of secession. 
 
2.1 Individualism and Universalism  
Liberalism has often been criticised for its adherence to individualism. In the recent 
debate between liberals and the so-called communitarians, some of the critique issued by 
the latter has centred on the implausibility of individualism’s social ontology (see e.g. 
Buchanan 1989: 852-3; Avineri & de-Shalit (eds.) 1992; Mulhall & Swift 1996). However, 
it is important to draw a distinction between ontological and ethical individualism. The 
latter “concerns what matters most morally, not what exists” (Buchanan 1991: 8).  
Ethical individualism “attaches supreme ethical significance to the human person” 
(Kelly 2005: 9). Collectives are not moral subjects on a par with individual human beings. 
Justifications of moral and legal rights must ultimately be grounded in the well-being and 
interests of individuals (Buchanan 2004: 413). Accordingly, collective social entities hold 
only instrumental value. As Alan Gewirth puts it, as long as “[i]t is the goods and rights of 
individuals that constitute the primary criterion or end of moral rightness”, then, “the 
preservation of the state or of the nation is valuable and worthy only insofar as this is of 
benefit to its individual members” (1982: 235).  
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 Universality means that the principles of a normative theory apply to all moral 
subjects on equal terms. Following Thomas Pogge,  
 
[a] moral conception, such as a conception of social justice, can be said to be universalistic if and only if 
(A) it subjects all persons to the same system of fundamental moral principles; (B) these principles assign 
the same fundamental moral benefits (e.g. claims, liberties, powers, and immunities) and burdens (e.g. 
duties and liabilities) to all; and (C) these fundamental benefits and burdens are formulated in general 
terms so as not to privilege or disadvantage certain persons or groups arbitrarily (2002:92). 
 
So, to the liberal, individuals are what matters, and they all matter equally. 
 
2.2 Liberalism and Group Rights 
I will now address what has been interpreted as a theoretical difficulty for liberal theory, 
namely, to recognize the concept of a group right. My position on this matter is on the 
whole in agreement with the perspective of Allen Buchanan (cf. 2004; 1991). Therefore, it 
is natural to start off with giving him the bench. When combined, Buchanan holds, 
individualism and universalism have led liberalism to be  
 
at minimum suspicious of the very concept of a group right. This suspicion has led at least some liberal 
thinkers to underestimate the role that group rights, including a right to secession, can play in protecting 
individuals and the values they affirm in their lives – particularly the value they find in being members of 
groups (1991: 8-9). 
 
On my reading, this quote reveals that what Buchanan has in mind is a “thin” 
understanding of a group right, one that roughly corresponds to the sum of individuals’ 
rights when they are exercised collectively. This becomes clearer in the following quote. 
On Buchanan’s account, group rights are  
 
ascribed to collections of individuals, and can only be exercised collectively or at least on behalf of the collective, 
usually through some mechanism of political representation whereby a designated individual or a subset of 
the group purports to act for the group as a whole (1991: 74-5, emphasis added). 
 
The two italicised conditions crucially distinguish group rights from the rights of an 
individual. Rights of the latter type are “ascribed to an individual, who in principle can 
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exercise the right independently, in her own name, on her own authority” (ibid.: 74, 
emphasis added).  
Thus far the notion of a group right is compatible with ethical individualism. 
Group rights are morally justified by reference to the well-being and freedom of 
individuals: they are given an “individualistic” justification.  Note, however, that this 
strategy only works as long as the granted right is a legal right, and where the moral 
justification is done with reference to the individual group members. The concept of a 
group moral right is problematic because that would require groups – qua groups – to be 
qualified as moral subjects on a par with individual human beings (Buchanan 2004: 414). 
So, a group right must be conceived of in the following sense: The right is designated to a 
group; if it is violated, compensation is owed to the group qua group, not to its members 
qua individuals; the group is not, however, the possessor of moral rights; their 
compensation is solely effected due to their possession of group legal rights, which are 
given an individualistic justification. 
 Let me illustrate these points somewhat by considering an example. The Canadian 
philosopher Will Kymlicka has written extensively on (what he regards as) the 
compatibility between liberalism and minority rights. His flagship argument for having the 
liberal state recognize certain sorts of group rights for minority cultures is based on what I 
called an individualistic justification. His argument proceeds in two steps: (1) Cultural 
membership is instrumentally important for ensuring a person’s well-being and self-
respect; (2) in some cases cultures can only be secured through special group rights; 
liberals should therefore be open to accommodate such rights for cultural minorities (cf. 
e.g. Kymlicka 1989: esp. Ch. 8 and 9). Clearly, this is an individualistic moral justification 
of a group legal right. The argument’s compatibility with ethical individualism rests 
crucially on the descriptive premise in (1). If cultural membership is not instrumentally 
valuable, then the argument fails in that respect. 
Whether one agrees with Kymlicka’s particular version of this justificatory strategy 
is not important, as long as the strategy itself is deemed congenial. If so, then one must 
admit that liberalism can indeed accommodate such group rights. This is the view I 
endorse. In fact, it strikes me as rather strange that a liberal might entertain the idea that 
her political morality cannot recognize a collective right of this sort. As Christopher 
Wellman rightly points out, such denial would imply that the concept of state sovereignty 
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is theoretically precluded. That would be a highly unpalatable consequence, and one that 
liberals cannot accept. Liberalism, writes Wellman,  
 
requires the state to stand in positions of sovereignty in a number of contexts. In other words, liberalism 
requires a number of group rights. For instance, all criminal punishments are collective rights. […] 
[V]irtually all liberals admit that reasonably just governments have the right to monopolistic control over 
criminal punishment. Thus one cannot deny the acceptability of all group rights without simultaneously 
rejecting the legitimacy of all existing states (1999: 36-7).   
 
To sum up, what I have done in this section is the following: I have dismissed the claim 
that liberalism (due to its individualism and universalism) must deny the ontological 
possibility of (any sort of) group rights. Obviously, if this was not the case, then a 
discussion of a right to secede, which is necessarily a group right, could not even get off 
the ground. It remains to be seen, however, whether other rights that must come into 
consideration will outweigh a prospective right to secession. It is to this task I turn in the 
subsequent chapters. But to be able to do so, it is necessary to first elaborate on the 
normative commitments of my theory.      
 
2.3 The Political Morality of Liberal Egalitarianism 
Liberalism is concerned with the interests and well-being of individuals. It is individuals 
that matter, and they matter equally. According to Will Kymlicka, liberal political theory 
can be developed from the fundamental assumption that each person has an essential 
interest in “leading a good life, in having the things that a good life contains” (1989: 10). 
That claim may seem to be banal, he says, but it has important consequences:  
 
For leading a good life is different from leading the life we currently believe to be good – that is, we 
recognize that we may be mistaken about the worth and value of what we are currently doing. We may 
come to see that we’ve been wasting our lives, pursuing trivial or shallow goals and projects that we had 
mistakenly considered of great importance (ibid.).  
 
Put differently, we have “an essential interest in revising those of our current beliefs about 
value which are mistaken” (ibid.: 12). But it is important to note that this does not imply 
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that an individual’s current ends should be subject to modification by other than herself. 
Writes Kymlicka: 
 
[W]hile we may be mistaken in our beliefs about value, it does not follow that someone else, who has 
reason to believe a mistake has been made, can come along and improve my life by leading it for me, in 
accordance with the right account of value. On the contrary, no life goes better by being led from the 
outside according to values the person doesn’t endorse. My life only goes better if I’m leading it from the 
inside, according to my beliefs about value (ibid.). 
 
These insights form the basis of liberal political theory. And they can be spelled out in the 
form of two preconditions for leading a life that is good: 
 
One is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life; the other is that 
we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and 
arguments our culture can provide (ibid.: 13, emphasis added).  
 
To establish these preconditions the liberal endorses a set of rights and liberties, which 
are crucial means to secure our (two-fold) essential interest in leading a good life: 
 
Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to live their lives in accordance with 
their beliefs about value […] Hence, the traditional liberal concern for civil and personal liberties. And 
individuals must have the cultural conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about 
the good life, and to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views. Hence, the 
equally traditional liberal concern for education, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, artistic freedom, etc. 
These liberties enable us to judge what is valuable in life in the only way we can judge such things – i.e. by 
exploring different aspects of our collective cultural heritage (ibid., emphasis added). 
So, firstly, the liberal state is committed to enable each person to freely pursue her own 
chosen ends. I will refer to the rights that secure this freedom as liberty-rights. Secondly, 
each person should be endowed with competency-rights, which provide the conditions that 
facilitate intelligent examination and re-examination of one’s current projects and goals. 
Both are necessary to lead a good life. 
 Now, there are two important lessons to be learned from this outline of liberal 
political theory. I will attend to them in the rest of this chapter. Firstly, Kymlicka’s outline 
is praiseworthy because it manages to capture in few words the intricate relationship 
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between two famed conceptions of liberty, negative and positive freedom9. Obviously, liberal 
egalitarianism is closely connected to both of them, and I will take care to elaborate upon 
the content of these commitments. As will become evident, the two conceptions of 
liberty are often regarded as irreconcilable. This leads up to the second lesson: Their 
putative incongruity carries the seedbed for a serious tension within liberal egalitarian 
morality. Upon this I will also elaborate.   
 
2.3.1 Negative Liberty: Freedom to Choose 
As seen above, a vital premise of liberal theory is that my life only goes better if I get to 
live it ‘from the inside’. This yields the liberal idea that a person should be free to pursue 
her desired ends. Negative liberty is freedom from something. All relevant restrictions on 
liberty are external to the person (Kelly 2005: 53). The only permissible restrictions are 
those inherent in the concept itself. The prime example of such a regulatory principle is 
what Joel Feinberg calls ‘the Harm-principle’ (cf. e.g. Feinberg 1973). In its simplest form, 
it holds that “individuals (at least those possessed of normal decision-making capacity) 
ought to enjoy liberty of action so long as their actions do not harm the legitimate 
interests of others” (Buchanan 1997: 56).  
The individual is entitled to ‘spheres of non-interference’. Certain limits must 
therefore be placed on state power. Whatever reasons and goals an individual may have 
for her action, what is important is that she is free to act (Galipeau 1994: 89). Isaiah 
Berlin, who made the distinction famous, puts it as follows: 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. 
[…] If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if 
this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it 
may be, enslaved. […] You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal 
by human beings. Mere incapacity to act is not lack of political freedom (2002: 169). 
 
This quote alludes to an important claim on the part of theorists in the negative camp, 
namely that liberty itself must be distinguished from the conditions for its use. This is where it 
                                                 
9 In the literature ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ are often used interchangeably. As Ian Carter (2003) points out, there have 
been some attempts to establish a clear distinction between these concepts, but they have not been influential. I thus 
follow the dominant approach when I treat liberty and freedom as synonymous. 
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goes wrong, so they say, for the partisans of positive freedom (who allegedly mix up the 
two). Berlin elaborates: 
 
It is important to discriminate between liberty and the conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or 
too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is 
nothing to him, but it is not thereby annihilated (ibid.: 45). 
 
It is not that the conditions for the use of liberty are unimportant. On the contrary,  
 
[t]he obligation to promote education, health, justice, to raise standards of living, to provide opportunity 
for the growth of the arts and the sciences, to prevent reactionary political or social or legal policies or 
arbitrary inequalities, is not made less stringent because it is not necessarily directed to the promotion of 
liberty itself, but to conditions in which alone its possession is of value, or to values which may be 
independent of it. And still, liberty is one thing, and the conditions for it are another (ibid.). 
 
What’s more, partisans of negative liberty in the Berlin tradition would be apt to hold that 
positive state actions (such as those mentioned in Berlin’s quote) indeed amount to 
violations of individual liberty. But, so they claim, such violations may nevertheless be 
justified by respect for other values (Waldron 1987: 133). Berlin himself, for instance, 
clearly recognizes the desirability of introducing 
 
a uniform system of general primary and secondary education in every country, if only to do away with 
distinctions of social status that are at present created or promoted by the existence of a social hierarchy 
of schools in some Western countries […] (Berlin 2002: 47-8). 
The state is indeed justified in taking such equalizing measures. But when it so does, we 
should acknowledge, Berlin holds, that liberty is sacrificed for the sake of some other 
good. Conceiving of liberty in the positive sense cannot circumvent this.  
 
2.3.2 Positive Liberty: Getting Our Choices Right 
The theorists of positive liberty focus on other liberal premises. Each person has an 
essential interest in leading a life that is good. That entails engaging in a continuous 
process of scrutiny concerning what is valuable in life. As seen above, liberals assume that 
a person recognizes that she may be mistaken in her value attributions. This implies that 
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some projects are more valuable than others; we can go wrong in our choices. I will 
elaborate on this assumption because it is not always well understood.  
It has been attributed to liberals that they are “sceptics about the rational 
defensibility of different conceptions of the good” and, that “such a moral scepticism 
underlies the liberal belief in the illegitimacy of governmental interference in the way 
people lead their lives” (Kymlicka 1989: 17). Hence, (so the saying goes) liberals get their 
commitment to individual liberty. This interpretation of liberal morality (and its defence 
of liberty) is, however, a fallacy. Following Kymlicka: 
 
The liberal position in fact rests precisely on the denial of [that] position […]. Consider Mill’s argument 
for liberty in both On Liberty and Utilitarianism. Some projects are more worthy than others, and liberty is 
needed precisely to find out what is valuable in life – to question, re-examine, and revise our beliefs about 
value […]. This is one of the main reasons why we desire liberty – we hope to learn about the good – and 
Mill says that our desire should be respected because it is not a vain hope. Liberty is important not 
because we already know our good prior to social interaction, or because we can’t know about our good, 
but precisely so that we can come to know our good, so that we can ‘track bestness’, in Nozick’s phrase. If 
we couldn’t learn about the good, a crucial premise in Mill’s argument for liberty would collapse. […] [He 
argues] for a right of moral independence not because our goals in life are fixed, nor because they are 
arbitrary, but precisely because our goals can be wrong, and because we can revise and improve them 
(ibid.: 18). 
 
So, value is not subjective. Some projects are more worthy than others. We want to get 
our choices right, and individual liberty is the best means to this end. But one is unfree (in 
the positive sense) unless one’s pursuit of the good life is conducted under certain conditions of 
competency.  
To elaborate: One must have the capacity for autonomous choice regarding one’s 
own goals and projects. Competency-rights facilitate a person’s ability to fairly evaluate 
alternative conceptions of the good – including the one currently held. Short of this 
ability, an individual is not truly free. Positive liberty is not a freedom from something, 
such as state interference. Rather, it is a freedom to something. 
 Further: The negative conception of liberty, holds the positive theorist, is not 
sufficiently sensitive to the threats to freedom – via infringements on competency – that 
stem from a society with social and economic inequalities (Hampton 1997: 171). 
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Redistributive institutions must therefore be established. This insight is crucial to liberal 
egalitarianism. Put simply, endowment-inequalities may influence our choices, and this 
constitutes an infringement on our freedom. How can this be?  
On the positive view, external restrictions are not the only possible hindrance to 
liberty. Equally conceivable are the internal restrictions, which may stem from “psychic 
and character-based obstacles to action” (Galipeau 1994: 94). This alludes to the link 
between positive liberty and autonomy. On the Kantian view, positive freedom was about 
individual agents exuding rational self-government (or autonomy, for short). It is a view 
of freedom as “the non-restriction of options – whether by other men’s obstruction or by 
factors internal to the agent himself, such as weakness of will, irrational fantasies or 
inhibitions or uncriticized socialization to conventional norms” (Gray 1995: 57-8). 
Jon Elster has argued, in a famous work on irrationality, that an agent can develop 
‘adaptive preferences’ (Elster 1983). The idea is that in situations where a person cannot 
achieve some desired goal, she is prone to gradually change her preferences for it. This 
change of preferences comes as a result of irrational self-persuasion, which happens 
because  
 
[i]t is difficult to live with the disappointment of unsatisfied preferences, and one way to deal with this 
disappointment is to persuade oneself that the unattainable goal was not in fact worth seeking. The 
extreme version of this phenomenon is the case of the ‘contented slave’, who adapts to her enslavement 
by claiming she does not want freedom (Kymlicka 2002:15-6).  
In spelling out the content of positive freedom, John Gray sides with this point: 
 
Many modern threats to freedom – propaganda, media manipulation and the tyranny of fashion – can be 
understood, I think, only by invoking some such conception of autonomy. Freedom may be curbed by 
means other than coercion, and it is a virtue of the idea of freedom as autonomy (in contrast with the 
more stringently negative view) that it accommodates this fact (1995: 58). 
 
Will Kymlicka sums up the importance of positive liberty in liberal egalitarian morality as 
follows. Liberalism, he writes, 
 
is not just concerned with the freedom to act on our present desires. That, of course, is not an 
insignificant freedom. […] But amongst the people who are leading their lives from the inside are people 
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who have been brainwashed into accepting certain ends as their own, and who are discouraged from 
trying any other ways of life, through the systematic control of socialization, of the press, and of artistic 
expression. And this is unacceptable for the liberal. […] [F]or Mill the conditions under which people 
acquired their ends were important: it mattered whether their education and cultural socialization opened 
up or closed off the possibility of revising their ends. He believed that this was important because people 
not only want to act on their choices, they also want to get those choices right (1989: 18-9). 
 
Now, against this backdrop it becomes clear why liberal egalitarians are concerned with 
equalizing material and natural resources: It is vital in securing the conditions for 
intelligent choice. Autonomy enables a proper pursuit of negative liberty. And, thus, the 
two-fold preconditions for leading a good life are fulfilled10.  
 Let me now attempt in brief (and somewhat summary) fashion to crystallize a 
tension that exists between the two conceptions of liberty. On the negative view, a 
person’s freedom is completely voluntaristic: There are no standards that qualify one’s 
actions as free other than the will-aspect; whatever I choose to do, I am exercising 
freedom if I act upon my own current desires; freedom is to live my life from the inside. 
On the positive conception, however, freedom gets connected to rationality. Here the idea 
is that my freedom (if it is to qualify as that) is contingent upon whether my behaviour 
exudes adherence to fixed standards of rational decision-making: My actions are not truly 
free unless they are the result of an informed and competent choice. 
Obviously, these two approaches are somewhat incongruous. As Waldron puts it, 
liberals have profound respect for the importance of living one’s life from the inside. 
However,  
 
[l]iberalism is also bound up in large part with respect for rationality, with the discipline of self-knowledge 
and clear-sightedness, and with the celebration of the human capacity to grasp and understand the world. 
But those capacities are not always in play when people make decisions about how to act in society. So 
that sense of the importance of reason in human decision-making is bound to introduce some tension into 
                                                 
10 The positive conception of liberty may be spelled out in a more extreme version than the one I have outlined here. 
On the Hegelian view, positive freedom is achievable only in “a harmonious and integrated society” (Gray 1995: 57). 
This means that an individual cannot be truly (positively) free unless she engages in complete “submission to and 
participation in the order of a good society” (Waldron 1987: 131). Isaiah Berlin has powerfully criticized this version 
of the conception (cf. e.g. Berlin 2002), in which freedom becomes equated with social order. Jeremy Waldron argues 
that liberals must repudiate the extreme version of positive liberty, because it fails to accommodate the idea of 
“standing back [from one’s] social order and subjecting it to critical evaluation” (1987: 131-2). As should be clear at 
this stage, liberal egalitarians will side with Waldron’s assertion. 
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a theory organized around respect for decisions made by individual men and women as they are in 
ordinary life (1987: 132-3). 
 
Now, this tension may be somewhat reconciled in liberal egalitarianism. It is plausible, I 
think, to suggest that the two conceptions can go together, as long as one leaves 
semantics aside. That is, by putting to rest the debate about what the “true” meaning of 
liberty really is, it seems that liberal egalitarians can base their morality on insights from 
both traditions. The rationale for this assertion could go something like this: The negative 
theorists can accept that equality is important (albeit they would not dream of confusing it 
with (what they regard as) liberty proper), whereas the positive theorists can say that it is 
indeed possible to draw a distinction between negative liberty and the conditions for its 
use (albeit they would never dream of allowing (what they regard as) liberty proper to be 
detached from the latter).  
Such a balanced “compromise” can be illustrated by the prevailing view of 
distributive justice in liberal egalitarianism. This view holds that redistributive schemes 
must be ‘endowment-insensitive’ and ‘ambition-sensitive’ (Kymlicka 2002: 74). Those two 
requirements reflect adherence to both conceptions of liberty. A person should be left 
free to determine for herself which goals and projects to pursue. Therefore redistribution 
must be ambition-sensitive. This respects negative liberty. The conditions for her choice, 
however, must be equalized before she chooses. This honours the idea of rational self-
government. By making redistribution endowment-insensitive, positive freedom also gets 
its due. I will refer to this sort of balancing as the intra-state reconciliation of liberal 
egalitarian commitments. 
 In the introductory chapter I dropped a hint that normative principles are often 
spelled out abstractly. When brought together and specified, their relationship may carry 
the seedbed for irreconcilable tension. As we have just seen, this is no less true for liberal 
morality. The tension between negative and positive liberty is, however, seemingly eased 
in a satisfactory way in the intra-state context. Can this be achieved in other contexts as 
well? That need not be so. A change of context may introduce a range of morally relevant 
differences. It is therefore necessary to spell out the proper interpretation of liberal 
principles for each separate context.  
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As we will now see, the issue of secession produces a change of scenery. The 
discussion of the proper relationship between state and individual is lifted to what I will 
call the meta-state level. We thus move from discussing state interference in the life of 
individuals within a jurisdiction, to addressing the justification of the very institutional 
framework of the state itself. What does liberal egalitarian morality have to say here? 
 
2.4 Liberal Egalitarianism and the Morality of Secession 
Let me start this section by declaring an assumption. I will assume throughout this essay 
that a well-functioning state must be territorially defined. This assumption should be rather 
uncontroversial. I will nevertheless provide a brief rationale for it.  
States are territorially defined for good reasons. That feature enables them to 
perform vital functions, such as securing peace and protecting the moral rights of their 
citizens. It is, however, possible to imagine that peace and security could be provided 
short of a territorially defined state. Christopher Wellman asks us to consider a situation 
where people could affiliate to different private security agencies “according to religion, 
eye color, preference for a particular set of rules, or by consent” (2005: 14). Could such an 
arrangement successfully replace the territorial state? Wellman answers in the negative: 
 
Peace would be unavailable in the absence of a decisive and accepted method of enforcing common rules 
and adjudicating conflicts. Because conflicts typically occur between parties in spatial proximity (since 
conflicts require interactions, and we most often interact with those nearby), and because a judge can 
peacefully and decisively settle conflicts only if she has authority over both parties, a judge must have 
power over all those who share spatial proximity. Thus, since conflicts will proliferate and escalate if those 
around us follow different rules and appeal to competing authorities, we cannot politically sort ourselves 
according to religious affiliation, sexual preference, or eye color as long as we live among people of 
varying religions, sexual preferences, and eye colors. […] [H]opefully this quick sketch explains why states 
must be territorially defined (ibid.: 14-5).  
 
I believe it does. The only way in which the private alternative could function 
satisfactorily was if all citizens chose to affiliate with the same firm. And, further, that the 
citizenry remained homogenous in that respect. I will not assess here the probability of that 
scenario. It strikes me as plausible, however, to assume that it is minimal. 
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Secession is the taking of territory. And, crucially, it is the taking of a part of a 
territory that is currently claimed by an existing state. Accordingly, as Allen Buchanan 
puts it, “rival theories of secession must be understood as providing alternative accounts 
of what it takes for a group to come to have a claim to territory” under these 
circumstances (2006: Section 2.1). A territorial claim on the part of group G is established 
by demonstrating that G is the justified wielder of political power in that territory. To 
make the case for a right to secede one must therefore demonstrate that the secessionists 
have a superior claim to the territory in question.  
So, to answer the question of what liberal egalitarianism has to say on secession, 
we must explore its approach to the justification of political power. I will now argue that the 
commitments of liberal morality can yield two presumptions to that effect, which appear 
to stand in an incongruous relation to each other.   
 
2.4.1 Negative Liberty and the Voluntaristic Approach to Political Power 
The negative conception of liberty puts individual freedom from external restrictions at 
centre-stage. This negative freedom includes the right of individuals to freely choose with 
whom to associate. This freedom of association may be invoked for various purposes. It 
applies to religious, and commercial, as well as political ones (Buchanan 2006: 255). When 
called upon in the latter sense, it forms the principle of (individual) political liberty. In its 
ultimate form, this liberty lay claim to determine the very design of the polity itself. Thus, 
the liberal commitment to negative freedom seemingly raises the presumption that a state 
is (fully) justified in wielding political power only insofar as it enjoys the (unanimous) 
consent of its citizenry.  
Why is this approach favourable to liberals? Jeremy Waldron points to the 
intellectual connection between liberal theory and the ideas of the Enlightenment. The 
Enlightenment, he writes, was characterized  
 
by a burgeoning confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its regularities and 
fundamental principles, to predict its future, and to manipulate its powers for the benefit of mankind 





Further: The social world,  
 
even more than the natural world, must be thought of as a world for us – a world whose workings the 
individual mind can grasp and perhaps manipulate deliberately for the benefit of human purposes (ibid.: 
134-5). 
 
These assumptions feed the following view on the justification of social arrangements: 
 
[A] social and political order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who have to live 
under it; the consent or agreement of these people is a condition of its being morally permissible to 
enforce that order against them (ibid.: 140). 
 
So, liberal theory is committed to a consent-based approach to justification. Because a given 
social arrangement (A), is not the necessary result of a divine order, a law of nature, 
tradition, nor any other antecedently given authority, and, on the premise that human 
persons have the capacity to scrutinize rules and principles, then it becomes paramount 
that the people who are to live under A are recognized as the ultimate source of justification. 
This is the idea of popular sovereignty. A is not justified unless its content is made acceptable 
to the people. Put differently, the arrangement must “serve [their] interests” (Buchanan 
2004: 102).  
 Against this backdrop it should be clear how the commitment to individual 
political liberty may yield the perhaps most intuitive expression of the idea of popular 
sovereignty: Popular sovereignty may be honoured by having all individuals exercising 
their right to individual political liberty through an act of actual consent, for instance in 
the form of a justification-conferring referendum. What better way to let the people 
decide? 11 It is therefore conceivable that liberal morality may form a prima facie case in 
favour of a right to secession, grounded in a presumption of political liberty. 
 
                                                 
11 Please note that I am being deliberately vague at this stage as to what the idea of popular sovereignty necessarily 
amounts to. To say that the people are “the ultimate source of justification” can obviously refer to justification being 
contingent upon an explicit act of actual consent. However, it can also signify that any justified arrangement must 
attend to the people’s objective interests; if these interests can be defined, then the existence of an act of actual 
consent may be viewed as superfluous; what’s more, if the people do not sanction arrangements that serve these 
objective interests, then justification can still be conferred, even against the explicit popular will; consent is thus 
interpreted as hypothetical. I will elaborate on this ambiguity, and its important implications, in Chapter 3. 
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2.4.2 Positive Liberty and the Rationalistic Approach to Political Power 
Positive liberty is concerned with a crucial part of a person’s ability to lead a good life. 
Certain conditions must be in place to ensure proper scrutiny of one’s current ends. 
These conditions are spelled out in the form of competency-rights, which, in a sense, may 
be regarded as the “servants” of liberty-rights. They are important because they better the 
conditions for a person’s pursuit of negative liberty. They are means to that end. On the 
other hand, those means themselves are not disposable. What is the rationale behind this?  
Recall that liberal egalitarians are concerned with securing the conditions for a 
continuous scrutiny of one’s current projects. Obviously, the liberal mode of such scrutiny 
cannot be achieved unless liberal institutions (who secure the topical conditions) are in 
place. Interestingly, for the liberal this implies that certain objective standards of good 
government are identifiable. And if this assertion is true, then, on reflection, no liberal 
approach to the justification of social arrangements seems to be acceptable unless it 
secures these specific conditions (for the proper pursuit of individual liberty). But if a 
wielder of political power can only be justified as long as it attends to a certain standard, 
then the idea of popular sovereignty (as it was spelled out above) is fundamentally 
challenged.  
In other words, the positive conception of liberty yields a liberal commitment to 
fixed standards of good government. This leads to a rationalistic approach to political power. 
Rather than having a polity approved through popular consent (which implied that any 
arrangement was acceptable as long as it was vindicated by popular approval), it’s 
justification is now functionally defined: A state that performs well on fixed measures of 
good government is justified, regardless of what the citizenry may express. This grounds 
what I will call the presumption of justified political power on the part of a well-functioning 
liberal state. Accordingly, liberal morality seems to be consistent with a prima facie case 
against a right to secede from such states.  
Of course, the problem with embracing this latter presumption is that the idea of 
popular sovereignty, on the face of it, gets eradicated. And the problem putatively goes 
the other way around as well. If we instead go along with the presumption of political 
liberty, we end up with violating the idea of fixed standards of good government: If the 
people have sovereign authority on matters of justification, then there is nothing to 
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prevent them from issuing illiberal institutions. We have here identified what Raino 
Malnes calls the problem of incongruity. 
According to Malnes, there is a general tension in modern political philosophy. 
When grappling with the issue of justifying political power, contract theorists must ask 
how the idea of popular sovereignty can be reconciled with the notion of substantive 
standards of good government (which is apparently equally plausible). Writes Malnes: 
 
While stressing the sanctity of the popular will, [some contract theorists] hold certain political 
arrangements to be right or wrong whatever people think of them, and suggest that these are not 
incongruous points of view. I believe their efforts reflect a general tension in modern political thought. 
The emphasis on freedom of choice in political as well as personal affairs does not root out a constant 
preoccupation with universal demands on actions and institutions, be they grounded in human dignity, 
welfare, order, or some other moral or social value. The question is whether these seemingly contradictory 
strands of argument really can be reconciled (1988: 63). 
 
The gravity of this problem for liberal theory is substantial. If I was on target above, then 
it should be clear that liberal commitments clash over the issue of justifying political 
power (and thus over secession). A further quote by Malnes is instructive: 
 
Take, for instance, the idea that every adult man and woman is entitled to political rights characteristic of 
democratic institutions: the right to vote for representatives to a legislative assembly, to give public 
expression to political opinions, to organize political parties, to stand for political office, etc. […] [The 
point is] that a political system may pass the test of popular approval even though it does not accord 
citizens such rights. […] It appears, in other words, that the idea of popular sovereignty rules out a 
principled adherence to democratic values. Such values have no bearing on the moral assessment of 
political arrangements unless citizens themselves value democracy, which is always an open question (ibid.: 
62).  
 
What, then, should the liberal egalitarian do to solve this apparent incongruity within her 
political morality? As I will now argue: By drawing on a distinction introduced by H.L.A 




2.5 In Defence of Rationalism: On Self-Embracing and Continuing Freedom 
Let me briefly elaborate on the rationalistic approach to political power. A state that 
performs well according to a certain standard (such as securing liberal rights) is regarded 
as justified. The polity is justified by virtue of the fact that it is rational to agree to be 
governed under these substantive standards. And it is rational, so the liberal holds, 
because, objectively speaking, each person has an essential interest in leading a life that is 
good. This universal human interest requires liberal institutions. A system of equal rights 
and liberties is not a subject for discussion. It stands rock-solid, even in the face of 
popular disapproval. How plausible is this idea? 
According to H.L.A. Hart, freedom can be either self-embracing or continuing. The 
two forms are mutually exclusive. Following Raino Malnes: 
A person enjoys continuing freedom if the same (manifold) options lie open to him (morally speaking) at 
every moment of his life, so that he has no second-order option to remove any alternative from the 
feasible set.  A person enjoys self-embracing freedom if the permissible courses of action encompass the 
opportunity of renouncing parts of the same freedom at will (1988: 83). 
 
This distinction is fruitful for demonstrating the morally relevant difference between 
allowing for freedom to be self-embracing in the intra-state context, and to allow for the 
same in what I above called the meta-state context. 
 Liberals are prone to allow for substantial restrictions on state interference in an 
individual’s private sphere. For instance, a person may want to waive (a portion of) her 
liberal rights, because that would be necessary for her to live in an illiberal enclave within 
the liberal state. As long as competency-rights are in place – and thus, that the person’s 
choice was made under satisfactory conditions – it is acceptable to leave her alone with 
her decision. Indeed, modern liberal states contain several such less-than-liberal private 
spheres, for instance in the form of religious communities, which are allowed to display 
(some) deviations from individual rights and liberties in their religious practices. Liberals 
can be expected to favour the individual’s preferences in such situations. As a 
consequence, individual liberty is indeed self-embracing in this private, intra-state context, 
albeit within limits (consider e.g. voluntarily engaging in comprehensive circumcision of 
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one’s sexual organs, or being voluntarily killed and eaten by a cannibal12. The former 
practice may perhaps be viewed as existing within a grey area, whereas most liberals 
would concede that the latter example clearly falls into the category of ‘instances to be 
interfered with, for the sake of human dignity’).  
However, even though one may accept that individual freedom can be (widely) 
self-embracing in the private spheres within a liberal jurisdiction, it does not follow that 
the design of the jurisdiction itself may be subject to the same self-embracing freedom 
(which in this context would amount to unrestricted popular sovereignty). Even though a 
person may choose to waive her liberal rights at T0, she still lives within a liberal state, and 
thus has the opportunity for revising her choice. As long as the polity itself secures these 
rights, she can reclaim them at will at T1. This opportunity to revise one’s current ends is 
objectively valuable. Because a single jurisdiction can only be designed in one way at a 
time, liberal institutions cannot be dismantled as seen fit. Thomas Pogge explains: 
 
While our society can contain many different kinds of communities, associations, and conceptions of the 
good, some liberal in character and others not, it can be structured or organized in only one way. If my 
neighbor wants to be a Catholic and I an atheist, we can both have our way, can both lead the life each 
deems best. But if my neighbor wants the U.S to be organized like the Catholic Church and I want it to be 
a liberal state, we can not both have our way. There is no room for accommodation here, and, if I really 
believe in egalitarian liberal principles, I should politically support them and the institutions they favour 
against their opponents. These institutions will not vary with the shifting strength of groups advocating 
various religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines (Pogge 1994: 217).  
 
Obviously, this insight is highly instructive for our purposes. Pogge’s outline strikes me as 
hitting the nail on the head. I further believe that liberal egalitarians will also endorse his 
assertion. At least so they should. If not, they would fail to balance the tension inherent in 
their morality, between popular sovereignty and substantive standards of good 
government. That is, their commitment to the latter would be completely eradicated, for the 
sake of honouring the former.  
Unfortunately, however, some sort of eradication appears to be inevitable. As seen 
above, the rationalistic approach to political power seems to frustrate popular sovereignty. 
                                                 




This leads to the following tentative proposition: The tension between negative and 
positive liberty can be reconciled within a jurisdiction, whereas when confronted with the 
issue of justifying the liberal institutional framework itself, the two liberal egalitarian 
commitments seem to clash irreconcilably. What I called intra-state reconciliation cannot 
be obtained at the meta-jurisdictional level. We end up with meta-state irreconcilability. 
So, the rationalistic approach to the problem of incongruity seems to entrench the 
tension between liberal commitments, rather than resolving it. In that sense this resort is 
not a “solution” at all. Nonetheless, the rationalistic alternative appears, at least thus far, 
to be the most plausible liberal approach to political power. But, again, that alternative 
apparently entails eradicating the idea of popular sovereignty altogether. And, as I shall 
now argue, it is not satisfactory to leave things like this.  
 
2.6 On the ‘Tension-Requirement’ and Liberal Theory Proper 
Etymology suggests that liberal morality is primarily concerned with the importance of 
liberty. As seen above, however, the concept of liberty comes in different conceptions. 
On Jeremy Waldron’s view, the debate over the proper conception has been fierce and 
unconstructive: 
 
The intensity and singlemindedness with which positions are taken and defended in this debate is 
surprising. Liberty is a concept which captures what is distinctive and important in human agency as such 
and in the untrammelled exercise of powers of individual deliberation, choice, and intentional initiation of 
action. Surely no-one can can [sic] really believe that what this is is something simple or self-evident, or 
that there can never be honest disagreements in this area. […] Our sense of what it is to have and exercise 
freedom is bound up with our conception of ourselves as persons and of our relation to value, other 
people, society, and the causal order of the world (1987: 130-1).    
    
Therefore, 
 
[t]o say then that a commitment to freedom is the foundation of liberalism is to say something too vague 
and abstract to be helpful, while to say that liberals are committed fundamentally to a particular 
conception of liberty is to sound too assured, too dogmatic about a matter on which, with the best will in 




Not surprisingly, Waldron’s recommendation is to seek out a balance between the 
negative and the positive conception of liberty. It should be apparent at this stage that 
that is a recommendation liberal egalitarianism takes seriously. Therefore, in spelling out 
my theory of secession, I will be at pains to pay due respect to the complex nature of the concept of 
liberty. This complexity can best be handled, I believe, by pressing ourselves to come up 
with the best possible balancing of the somewhat incongruous commitments.  
By this I mean that regardless of which commitment one chooses as the “basic” 
principle of one’s theory, one must provide a rationale that shows (A) how the other 
commitment can still be sufficiently honoured within one’s approach. And, regardless of 
whether eradication of the other commitment can be avoided: One must also show (B) 
why one’s chosen alternative (nonetheless) constitutes the best overall solution to the 
problem of incongruity. In consequence, this helps identify the best liberal approach to 
secession. Put bluntly, what I am prescribing here is simply that we bring along the tension as 
far as we can. Call this methodological prescription the (two-fold) Tension-Requirement for a 
proper liberal egalitarian theory (of secession).  
Due to that requirement I do not yet consider this chapter’s defence of the 
rationalistic approach to political power as a sufficient reason to reject the presumption of 
political liberty (although I think that that latter presumption should indeed be rejected): I 
have not (yet) provided a rationale for (A*) how the idea of popular sovereignty can be 
somewhat accommodated within the rationalistic approach. And, regardless of whether 
A* succeeds: I have not (yet) shown (B*) why the voluntaristic approach to political 
power (which grounds the presumption of political liberty) may nevertheless be regarded 
– all-things-considered – as the poorer alternative. In the next chapter I will pursue A*. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will address B*.
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In the previous chapter I argued that rationalism seemed to be the best approach to the 
justification of political power. The drawback was the putative eradication of the 
commitment to popular sovereignty. In the first part of this chapter I will argue that the 
rationalistic approach can resist this latter implication. By detaching the idea of popular 
sovereignty from actual-consent theory, it becomes plausible to claim that the liberal 
tension is largely resolved. If so, then the first part of what I called the Tension-
Requirement is fulfilled. This raises a presumption in favour of Just-Cause theory as the 
proper liberal approach to secession. In the second part of the chapter I will discuss the 
specific principles of such a theory. However, the list of injustices that can ground a right 
to secede from a liberal state will prove to be sparse.  
 
3.1 Why Rationalism does not Undermine Popular Sovereignty 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a theory of secession must include an account of 
the justified wielding of political power. We further saw that the liberal mode of 
justification is consent-based: Any social arrangement must be made acceptable to each 
citizen. Call this idea (i). Closely related to this idea is the view that the people are the 
ultimate source of justification. This was presented as (ii) the idea of popular sovereignty. It is 
uncontroversial to claim that both of these ideas are central in liberal morality. Moreover, 
as will become clear, they are closely connected. 
 In 2.4.1, (i) was presented in its most intuitive interpretation, namely as the idea of 
actual-consent. This interpretation yielded a voluntaristic expression of popular 
sovereignty (VE): What better way to honour the people as the ultimate justification-
conferring source than to require an act of actual consent on their part. VE helped form 
what I called the voluntaristic approach to the justification of political power (VJ). The 
unquestionable importance of (i) and (ii) gave merit to that approach. There was a 
problem, however: If the actual consent of the people is necessary to honour the 
venerable idea of popular sovereignty, then that idea appears to be irreconcilable with the 
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notion that certain forms of good governance (such as democratic rule) is justified 
regardless of the popular will. This latter commitment (to fixed standards of good 
government) yielded the rationalistic approach to the justification of political power (RJ). 
In what follows I will argue that liberal morality can, by endorsing RJ, largely reconcile 
this problem of ‘meta-state irreconcilability’.  
It is important to note that the liberal defence of consent and popular sovereignty 
is uncontroversial only as long as these ideas are spelled out in abstract fashion. Now, it is 
true that VE may have an intuitive ring to it. But that is not to say that VE is the only 
plausible way in which the abstract ideas of (i) and (ii) can be concretised. As we will now 
see, by giving them a rationalistic expression (RE), the apparent irreconcilability can be 
circumvented.  
 
3.1.1 Two Versions of Consent-Theory 
Liberal theory may clearly foster incongruous views on the issue of justification. In 
Chapter 2 I demonstrated how VJ and RJ could be developed from central liberal 
commitments. What I did not bring markedly to the fore, however, was that both 
approaches can lay claim to be consent-based (albeit I did allude to this possibility in 
Section 2.4.1, note 3): Liberal consent-theory simply contains two traditions.  
In its perhaps most intuitive version, the theory of consent turns on an act of actual 
consent on the part of the citizenry: If I do not literally approve to be governed by state S, 
then S is not justified in having such dominion over me. Even if S is a well-functioning 
liberal democratic state, its justification can be instantly dismantled if I decide to renounce 
my consent to be governed by it. It is this rendition of consent-theory that fits into VJ.  
The theory of hypothetical consent, on the other hand, does not focus on the aspect 
of will at all. Instead, this account is concerned with reason: “The test of a just society 
[…] is not whether the individuals who live in it have agreed to its terms, but whether its 
terms can be represented as the object of an agreement between them” (Waldron 1987: 142). 
This version of consent-theory fits in with RJ.  
But if consent-theory comes in two versions (which initially may seem equally 
plausible), then it seems very likely that the idea of popular sovereignty can be concretised 
in two (likewise initially equally plausible) ways as well. We have already alluded to the 
voluntaristic concretisation, VE, which incorporated the idea of actual-consent. To say 
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that the people are ‘the ultimate source of justification’ can obviously mean that 
justification requires an explicit act of actual consent on the part of the citizenry.  
However, one can also hold that the people are the ultimate source of justification 
in the sense that any justified arrangement must attend to the interests of the people. This 
interpretation means that it is these interests that ultimately matter, and that a justified 
social arrangement must adequately serve them. Now, if these interests can be objectively 
defined (for instance by reference to the universal wants and needs of human beings), 
then the existence of an act of actual consent may be viewed as superfluous; consent is 
thus interpreted as hypothetical. What’s more, if I sanction arrangements that are contrary 
to my objective interests, then justification of these arrangements can still be conferred, 
even against my explicit will. This is the rationalistic interpretation of popular sovereignty, 
or what I above called RE. 
The upshot of this is simple. If justification is contingent upon actual consent, 
then the commitment to fixed standards of good government cannot be coherently 
included: If (i) is interpreted as actual-consent, then (ii) constitutes VE; and, under VE, 
meta-state irreconcilability applies. The following should also be clear from this brief 
sketch: If we instead adhere to RE, then the tension may be reconciled; if consent can be 
hypothetical, then the idea of popular sovereignty is given a rationalistic expression, and 
can thus be accommodated within RJ; accordingly, the meta-state irreconcilability ceases 
to apply. By endorsing RJ it appears as if we can go far in honouring both popular 
sovereignty and fixed standards of good government. 
If I have thus far been on target, then the first part of the Tension-Requirement is 
fulfilled: Under RE, the liberal tension is largely reconciled. Now notice the following: 
Under the premise that the Tension-Requirement is valid, this fact (RE’s reconciliatory 
ability) by itself raises a presumption in favour of RJ as the proper liberal approach to political power. 
The rival approach, VJ, appears, at least for the time being, as incapable of achieving 
anything similar when it comes to reconciliatory ability13. 
In addition, we can build on the conclusory case for the presumption by pursuing 
the second part of the Tension-Requirement. In this context, that entails further 
demonstrating the relative weaknesses of VJ as compared to RJ. There are two strategies 
                                                 
13 In Chapter 4 I will discuss an attempt to show that Choice-theory can achieve reconciliation. This can be done, so 
the argument goes, as long as some rationalistic elements are incorporated into the model of political power.    
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to that effect. Firstly, VJ relies on VE, which in turn relies on the idea of actual-consent. 
We can therefore challenge VJ by (a) showing that the idea of actual-consent is not 
theoretically coherent. Secondly, we can (b) demonstrate that liberals should reject VJ 
because the trade-offs involved in endorsing it is too costly relative to a vindication of RJ. 
I will start with (a). 
 
3.1.2 The Actual-Consent Approach and Its Putative Deficiencies 
If the demonstration of actual consent is the only way to confer moral justification on a 
polity, then neither existing, nor prospective, states would qualify as justified wielders of political power 
(cf. e.g. Buchanan 2004: 243). At best we can only have partially justified ones – in which 
some of the citizens express their consent, while others do not. If this alleged empirical 
fact is true, then it seems that the partisans of actual-consent must give up the possibility 
of justifying any real-world polity.  
Now, this implication may sound unfortunate and counter-intuitive indeed. Isn’t it 
plausible to assert that justification can be conferred upon at least some existing states? 
Liberal democracies, at the very least, must somehow be good candidates in that respect. 
It should be uncontroversial to claim that this suggestion accords well with our intuitions. 
So, there must be something wrong with the requirement of actual consent. (The theory 
of hypothetical-consent is, of course, not afflicted with this problem at all.) 
The partisans of actual-consent might concede that their approach may run 
counter to some of our intuitions. But they may nevertheless reply that perhaps it is our 
intuitions that should give way here: On reflection, even though existent liberal 
democratic states would necessarily get a tarnished reputation in the topical sense, that 
implication should not sway us into denying that the actual-consent approach itself can 
nevertheless be valid. Call this reply X. 
It should be rather easy, I think, to realise the validity of X. Take the analogy to the 
concept of justice. It is possible to show that the ultimate principles of justice should not 
be grounded in facts. As G.A. Cohen puts it:  
 
When a fact about human incapacity is said to exclude a principle because it can’t be obeyed, we may then 
ask what we should say about the putatively excluded principle on the counterfactual hypothesis that it 
could be obeyed. And it is only when we thus clear the decks of facts about capacity, and get the answer to that 
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It makes perfect sense to say that “we ought to eliminate as much injustice as we can”. The statement is 
consistent with the claim that “You ought to do A implies that you can do A”, but not with the view that 
feasibility establishes the bounds of justice. If justice is, as Aristotle said, each person getting her due, then 
it is her due irrespective of the constraints that might make it permissible to give it to her (ibid.). 
 
Similarly, the restraint imposed by the empirical lack of capacity (i.e. the very low 
probability of enjoying unanimous actual consent) – which are displayed by former, 
existent, and possibly future, states – should not on its own count as a sufficient reason to 
reject the normative principle exerted by the actual-consent approach. This is so simply 
because that principle may be valid regardless of the facts of our world. 
 Closely related to this, the important distinction between ideal and nonideal theory 
may also strengthen X. Following John Rawls, ideal theory is “a necessary complement to 
nonideal theory without which the desire for change lacks an aim” (1996: 285). So, even 
though the theory of actual-consent may not be feasible as a practical measure of 
justification in our nonideal world, its principles may nevertheless be valid, and of 
important use, in the realm of ideal theory. Evidently, the first objection to actual-consent 
theory is not mortal.  
 The plausibility of X notwithstanding, when faced with the utopian character of 
the consent requirement, several partisans of the actual-consent approach have resorted 
to a so-called ‘tacit’ conception of actual consent. That latter conception is famously 
associated with John Locke, who regarded, for example, a person’s continued residence in 
the polity as a sufficient display of actual consent (cf. 2002: paragraphs 119-22). This leads 
up to the second objection: The tacit version seemingly fails, because it can be shown that 
actual-consent theory presupposes some sort of legitimate authority. (Again, the hypothetical version 
of consent is not stricken by this problem.) Allen Buchanan explains:  
 
The problem with taking continued residence as a sign of tacit consent is that there is no such thing as a 
natural act of consent, at least not in the case of consent to political power. For some bit of behaviour – 
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for example, saying “Aye” in an assembly – to count as consent there must be certain conventions already 
in place; for example, conventions establishing where and when groups must meet if they are to count as 
assemblies, who is qualified to participate, […] and so on. To think that there is some act that could count 
as consent prior to a process that establishes such conventions is as incorrect as thinking that an exchange 
of words between two people could count as a contract in the absence of a framework for legal 
institutions (2004: 244-5). 
 
This strikes me as a plausible objection to the tacit version of actual-consent theory14. But 
can we thus regard the actual-consent approach in general as invalidated? Things may not 
be quite as simple.  
Imagine the following scenario: The citizens of state S have not been given the 
opportunity to approve or disapprove of S as the wielder of political power. Instead, S has 
established its political institutions through more or less coercive means. Hence, the 
government of S is not justified on the actual-consent model. S’s institutions, however, 
are at present quite robust, and they cover the whole citizenry with regard to upholding 
the law and spreading information through well-established channels of communication. 
In this situation, it should be obvious that S is able to define for its citizenry what counts as 
a valid act of consent. So, even if the conditions for a well-functioning tacit-consent 
approach were absent before S (coercively) established its rule, the prospect for relevantly 
exercising that approach now is quite bright. In other words, if a wielder of political power 
– regardless of its justification (or lack of such) – is in place, then it has the ability to 
define a sufficient set of rules. Thus, on the premise that actual-consent theory is valid, 
nothing should keep us from requiring S to arrange a justification-conferring referendum. 
The problem, of course, is that this conclusion may be hard to resist even if the polity at 
present adheres to liberal standards of good government. Still, on its own, the second 
objection to actual-consent theory also fails. Consequently, strategy (a) does not work. 
 So, in order to argue persuasively against the actual-consent approach, it seems 
that we must have recourse to the criticism issued in Section 2.5: If actual-consent theory 
is recognized, then liberal institutions may be dismantled as seen fit. To reiterate: From the 
liberal perspective this is an unacceptable implication because it seemingly amounts to a 
                                                 
14 Another famous objection stems from David Hume. It holds that continued residence cannot qualify as an act of 
tacit consent because many people in many states may not have a real choice here: The costs of exit may be high and 
the prospects of bettering one’s situation elsewhere may be dim (Buchanan 2004: 244). Thus, to remain in place 
should not be regarded as a generally valid act of consent.   
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complete eradication of the commitment to fixed standards of good government. Put 
differently, on balance, liberals seem tentatively prone to reject actual-consent theory due 
to the trade-offs involved in endorsing it. To use a metaphor, when placed on a pair of 
scales that measure the relative importance of liberal commitments, the commitment to 
fixed standards of good government seems likely to outweigh the idea of actual-consent. 
We have thus moved on to consider strategy (b). In what follows I will elaborate on the 
configuration of the scales, both concerning which objects that are placed on it, as well as 
the weight of each object. 
Now, if I was on target in 3.1.1, then it should be clear that the objects on the 
scales are as follows: On the VJ-side we have the idea of actual-consent per se, because 
that idea is no longer accompanied by the liberal notions of consent and popular 
sovereignty. This is so because the RJ-side can also accommodate these abstract liberal 
commitments. On the RJ-side we find the liberal commitment to fixed standards of good 
government. The significance of that commitment was discussed earlier (in Section 2.5).
  
 The partisans of actual-consent theory may, however, try to strengthen their case 
by arguing that another object should be added to their side of the scales. The rationale 
for this goes as follows: Is it not unfortunate, they might say, that the current objection 
(to actual-consent theory), which is meant to invalidate VJ, is premised on the validity of 
the rival position RJ? This, so they object, amounts to begging the question. To reply: 
Recall that we have thus far established a presumption in favour of RJ as the proper liberal 
approach to political power. Thus, the burden of proof falls on the partisans of actual-
consent theory. To thwart the presumption in favour of RJ, they must show that VJ – 
regardless of the two approaches’ respective reconciliatory ability – is nonetheless the best 
liberal approach to political power. I will now address a possible attempt to that latter 
effect. 
 
3.1.3 Is the Rationalistic Approach Really a Proper Justification? 
Says the actual-consent theorist: “Fine. It may be true that the rationalistic approach 
presumably outperforms its voluntaristic rival when it comes to reconciling the tension 
between liberal commitments. However, that is the only presumption-raising fact yet 
submitted. Now, I propose that the burden of proof should be turned on its head, 
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because RJ does not constitute a proper justification at all. Its relative weakness is that it 
disregards the crucial idea of political obligation”. What does this mean?  
It is often assumed that moral justification cannot be conferred upon a polity 
unless that polity enjoys the right to be obeyed by its citizenry. That is, a self-imposed political 
obligation on the part of each citizen is regarded as a necessary condition. It follows from 
the very nature of obligation that it cannot be established short of an act of actual 
consent: If I consent to an arrangement, then it is my agreement that makes it 
impermissible for me to do what it would otherwise be permissible for me to do 
(Waldron 1987: 136). In other words, if I consent to be governed, then I am obliged to 
obey the wielder of political power. Conversely, in the absence of my consent, there can 
be no such obligation. Therefore, when viewed in this way, justified political power is 
contingent upon the explicit approval of those being governed.  
Obviously, if true, this adds considerable leverage to actual-consent theory. In fact, 
if political obligation is required to justify political power, then VJ is vindicated, not 
merely as the proper liberal approach to justification, but also as the only feasible approach 
whatsoever. This would alter the configuration of the objects on the scales: As long as RJ 
is not a proper justification, then the VJ-side of the scales can be extended. It would thus 
include the idea of actual-consent, and the ability to provide a cogent approach to 
justification. Clearly, this would affect the level of the scales. But how plausible is this 
reconfiguration?  
According to Allen Buchanan, a satisfactory account of the morality of political power 
must answer the two following questions: 
 
(1) [U]nder what conditions is it morally justifiable for some agent or agents to wield political power (the 
agent-justifiability question), and (2) under what conditions do those upon whom political power is exercised 
have sufficient reasons to comply with its demands (the reasons-for-compliance question)? (2004: 238, 
emphasis added).  
 
On Buchanan’s view, a state can satisfactorily answer both questions when it governs in a 




(1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields 
power and (2) provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the 
most basic human rights (ibid.: 247). 
 
Buchanan grounds his assertion as follows: 
 
The chief moral purpose of endowing an entity with political power is to achieve justice. Given the state’s 
coercive and monopolistic character and the fact that it necessarily involves inequality of power, nothing 
short of this could justify creating an entity so capable of causing harm, infringing on freedom, and 
creating or maintaining inequalities (ibid., emphasis added) 
 
Importantly, this rationale asserts cogency from a liberal perspective. Indeed, the provision 
of justice is the hallmark of the liberal conception of what states are primarily for: 
 
The Moral Equality Principle requires us to take very seriously certain basic interests that all persons have; 
it grounds both positive and negative duties of justice […]. One exceptionally important way of promoting 
these fundamental interests is by ensuring that the basic human rights are protected. Adequate protection 
of basic human rights requires the exercise of political power – an agency to make, apply, and enforce 
laws, and to approximate supremacy in so doing. 
So long as political power is wielded for the sake of protecting basic human rights and in ways 
that do not violate those same rights, it is morally justified – unless those over whom it is exercised have a 
right not to be coerced to respect basic human rights. But there is no right not to be coerced to respect 
basic human rights, so long as coercion is used in ways that do not themselves violate basic human rights 
(ibid.: 248). 
 
It is interesting to note how well Buchanan’s rationale accords with liberal egalitarian 
morality (as it was outlined in the previous chapter): It is individuals that matter, and they 
all matter equally; some individual interests are objective, and these are crucially maintained 
through a set of individual rights; a polity is necessary to secure those rights; and, one’s 
personal freedom is not self-embracing in the meta-state context (i.e. one is not free to dismantle 
the very arrangement that constitutes the only guarantor of liberal rights, namely the 
liberal state).  
 In sum: The two questions that a theory of political power must address are both 
answered by invoking the principle of equal regard for persons. We are all morally 
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required, under the Moral Equality Principle, to promote universal basic human interests. 
This gives us sufficient reasons to comply with a social arrangement that so does. And, 
naturally, that arrangement fulfils the agent-justifiability condition (Buchanan 2004: 249). 
Now, on Buchanan’s account, if both questions are answered satisfactorily, then 
political legitimacy is established. It is not additionally required that the wielder of political 
power enjoys the actual (and thus obligation-conferring) consent of its citizenry. 
Strikingly, none of the two conditions for political power turns on the concept of 
obligation. So, an entity has political legitimacy  
 
if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power, where to wield political power is to (make a 
credible) attempt to exercise supremacy, within a jurisdiction, in the making, application, and enforcement 
of laws (2004: 235, emphasis added).  
 
Interestingly, if this argument goes through, then a proper justification of political power 
(as political legitimacy) is thus detached from political voluntarism. Instead, it is given a 
rationalistic expression. In contrast, an entity has political authority  
 
if and only if, in addition to (1) possessing political legitimacy, it (2) has the right to be obeyed by those 
who are within the scope of its rules; in other words, if those upon whom it attempts to impose rules have 
an obligation to that entity to obey it (ibid.: 237). 
 
So, what is the upshot of this? If Buchanan is correct in asserting that agent-justifiability 
and reasons-to-comply on the part of the citizenry are necessary and sufficient conditions 
for justifying political power, then the hypothetical version of consent theory can do the 
job. Accordingly, the attempt to invalidate RJ as a proper justification fails. And the 
configuration of the scales remains the same. 
Buchanan’s argument is in accordance with, and helps elaborate, the defence of RJ 
that I have already presented (in Section 2.5). But, again, there is one thing that is still 
throwing a spanner into the works: The mandatory liberal commitment to individual 
political liberty does ground the idea of actual-consent. At least, this is so given that 
political liberty is interpreted in its ultimate form. And actual-consent is still incompatible 
with RJ. Buchanan’s defence of political legitimacy as a proper justification does not 
change this. Therefore, to eventually dispose of the idea of actual-consent – and thereby 
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also VJ – we must address the question of how much weight we shall ascribe to each of 
the incongruous commitments that are situated on the scales.  
I will now argue that actual-consent on its own – that is, when detached from the 
uncontroversial liberal commitment to popular sovereignty – is not a pronounced liberal 
idea at all. And this is so simply because the trade-offs that are associated with endorsing 
it are not acceptable to liberals. This will help substantiate the assessment that the VJ-side 
of the scales does not carry much relative weight. But first, let me briefly mention one 
final suggestion, S, that may be forwarded to circumvent having to make this latter move 
(which necessarily involves a sacrifice, namely the rejection of the principle of individual 
political liberty interpreted in its ultimate form). (Note, however, that S will crack up 
when faced with the imminent invalidation of actual-consent as a crucial liberal idea.)  
Is it perhaps so, that both justificatory approaches can defend their place within 
liberal egalitarianism? Maybe the liberal can view political legitimacy as the best applicable 
measure of justification in our nonideal (or facts-restricted) world, whereas political authority 
is (nevertheless) the liberal ideal (which exudes ‘the normative ultimate’, in Cohen’s 
phrase). In that sense, RJ and VJ respectively, are both compatible with liberal theory. 
This is suggestion S. (If S is valid, then we might dispose of our scales altogether.) 
One scholar that sides roughly with S is A. John Simmons. On his view, no 
existing states have the right to be obeyed. This is so because actual-consent theory is 
right, and no states enjoy unanimous consent. But, “this does not imply that all states are 
equally bad”: Some states are “decent and benevolent”, and they  
 
may thus be justified by reference to the good that they do, which is just to say that they merit our 
support, and we thus have moral reason to provide it. But saying that some states merit support is not at 
all the same as saying that they have a right to direct and coerce us, which we are bound to honour (1999: 
769-70). 
 
In other words, the rationalistic approach to the justification of political power may be a 
practical tool for distinguishing between ‘benevolent’ and ‘evil’ real-world states. Even 
though both categories are unjustified in the voluntaristic sense, the rationalistic approach 
  
44 
can help us explain why the former category is (at least) more justified than the latter15. 
This suggestion may seem reasonable. I will now argue, however, that it fails to capture 
the core of liberal egalitarian morality.  
 
3.1.4 Why Actual-Consent Is Not Sacrosanct 
Suggestion S is premised on the view that the idea of actual-consent itself is a liberal 
stronghold. And, so its partisans could say, even though actual-consent may not be 
applicable as a practical measure of justification in our nonideal world, it is nevertheless 
so sacrosanct as to constitute the ultimate moral point of reference for liberal ideal theory. 
This is wrong. 
As Christopher Wellman rightly asserts, the actual-consent approach, in its pure 
form, is a libertarian, rather than a liberal idea. Most liberal theorists, he claims, view the 
state as justified when it functions well according to certain standards of good 
government (1995: 155). Wellman’s latter assertion is a descriptive claim, which can be 
settled by conducting a meta-study, whereas his first assertion is more interesting for 
political philosophy. The two are, however, connected. The validity of the latter assertion 
can be grasped, I think, by viewing it quite simply as a result of the validity of the former.  
As should be clear at this stage, the political morality of liberal egalitarianism is 
committed, in important respects, to a functional (or rationalistic) approach to 
justification. The fact that the liberal commitment to individual political liberty may (if 
radically interpreted) ground a rival position (VJ), does not alter this fact. There are 
weighty reasons to endorse RJ (cf. e.g. Sections 2.5 and 3.1.1).  
Further, we have earlier seen that liberal egalitarian morality contains a problem of 
incongruity at the meta-state level. This problem can be sought resolved in different ways. 
But the tension itself invalidates neither of the two approaches that aim at resolving it. 
The tension does, however, imply that neither approach can be bought for free (as the metaphor 
with the scales should have clearly – albeit perhaps a little ungracefully – demonstrated). 
For example, if liberal egalitarians go for RJ, then the inevitable rejection of actual-
                                                 
15 Please note that Simmons uses a terminology in which a ‘justified’ polity is (roughly) similar to what Buchanan 
regards as a polity with ‘political legitimacy’. Further, for Simmons, ‘legitimacy’ is consonant with what Buchanan 
calls ‘political authority’ (cf. Simmons 1999: 740, 745-6). Due to the varying usage of these terms in the literature, I 
have chosen to operate with the more neutral term ‘(morally) justified wielder of political power’ as a supra-concept, 
which encompasses both of the above conceptions. (As should be clear by now) I utilize the denominators 
‘rationalistic’ and ‘voluntaristic’, respectively, to differentiate between the two different conceptions (of moral 
justification) wherever necessary.    
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consent – and, accordingly, the radical interpretation of individual political liberty – 
represents the cost of that endorsement. The decisive question can thus be posed as 
follows: Which approach represents the best bargain? Another way to pose that question 
is to ask how much weight is assigned to each of the two scale pans, VJ and RJ.  
I will now attempt to further elaborate on the configuration of the scales in that 
respect. Consider the following two claims: 
 
(1) Individuals do not have a moral right to put the liberal rights of neither 
themselves, nor others, in (ultimate) jeopardy (cf. Section 2.5). 
(2) The justification of the liberal state is contingent upon actual consent. 
 
It is simply not coherent to hold 1, while also holding 2. The liberal egalitarian must make 
a choice.  
Realising this dilemma, even John Locke (whose writings have often been invoked 
by libertarians) abstained from endorsing a pure actual-consent approach. On the 
contrary, he placed clear moral restrictions on public choice, when it pertains to the issue 
of institutional justification (Malnes 1988: 77-84). (I will say more on this aspect of 
Locke’s theory in Chapter 5.) What’s more: Even Hobbes, in spite of his premise of 
moral subjectivism (which, as alluded to in Chapter 2, is an illiberal idea), did rely on a 
conception of certain objective human interests, namely the preference for personal 
security, which accordingly fed a likewise fixed preference for having absolute 
government rather than having no government whatsoever (Malnes 1988: 67-8). 
To put it differently, the liberal egalitarian should not have a very hard choice here 
at all. Firstly, if 1 is rejected, then a crucial premise for leading a good life is (or is at least 
in unacceptable danger of being) eradicated. Moreover, that eradication happens in favour 
of an idea (actual-consent) that is not even a very pronounced liberal one: It simply is not 
especially liberal to recognise the commitment to individual political liberty in its ultimate justification-
conferring form (which of course is necessary to ground the idea of actual-consent). (I will 
return to this latter point in Section 4.4 below.) Or to put it more mildly: At least, it is not 
clear why liberal egalitarian morality should accommodate that radical interpretation of 
the topical commitment (cf. 2.5 above).  
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The weight of each side should now be clearer. And the urgency of VJ’s rejection 
should be apparent when we have now crystallized the configuration of the scales: If the 
partisans of actual-consent are to retain that idea, as well as their alleged liberal outlook, 
then they will have to buy the former at a very high price. When endorsing VJ one must 
concede that the important liberal commitment to fixed standards of good government is 
outweighed by the idea of actual-consent per se. But this is too high a price to pay. The 
partisans of actual-consent cannot keep trading on the uncontroversial liberal credentials 
of consent and popular sovereignty. Even though it might have appeared (on the face of 
it) as if these commitments vindicated VJ, they are no longer doing that job. This is so 
because both commitments can be accommodated within RJ.  
What’s more: Recall from Chapter 2 that denying the principle of individual 
political liberty in the meta-state context does not rule out that it can be properly 
honoured at the intra-state level. This re-emphasises that it is the idea of actual-consent 
itself that is at stake. We need not reject the principle of individual political liberty 
altogether, we only deny its most radical interpretation. In other words, when the objects on 
the scales are clarified like this, the idea of actual-consent will simply have to give in.  
So, contrary to what S claims, the vindication of the rationalistic elements in liberal 
egalitarian morality is not due to a concession in the face of a nonideal world. Instead, the 
endorsement of RJ is as it is because that approach emerges – on balance – as the morally 
right position to take. This is what ideal theory looks like. It is not possible to circumvent 
the problem of incongruity by invoking the distinction between nonideal and ideal liberal 
theory. The tension simply resides within the latter. S fails. 
 
To sum up, then: Returning to the Tension-Requirement, in this first section I have 
somewhat fulfilled that requirement’s first part. In Chapter 2 it appeared as if the idea of 
popular sovereignty were in tension with the commitment to fixed standards of good 
government. It should now be clear that the tension is substantially reduced as long as the 
former idea is given a rationalistic expression. Let me be the first to acknowledge, though, 
that the tension is only partially reduced: Something is lost when we reject VJ. It cannot 
be circumvented that the idea of actual-consent per se is not accommodated. Fortunately, 
that sacrifice is bearable. It is also necessary.  
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Further, by providing a preliminary critique of VJ as part of a proper liberal theory 
of secession, I have also gone some way in fulfilling the second part – B* – of the Tension-
Requirement. (I will go all the way soon, but that will have to wait until Chapters 4 and 5.)  
What’s more: The partial fulfilment of B* entails that this chapter provides a 
further (presumptive) vindication of RJ, which implies that a Just-Cause theory of 
secession is strengthened as the proper liberal alternative. This is significant. Under the 
assumption that a well-functioning liberal state is (morally) justified in wielding political power, a right 
to secede must be demonstrated by way of appealing to other facts than the mere lack of 
actual consent: The case for secession must be grounded in facts that raise a valid (and 
superior) claim to territory on the part of the secessionists; these facts must constitute 
violations of justice. Secession must have a just cause. (Containment of non-consenting 
individuals is not itself an injustice.) That is the pivotal lesson of this chapter. 
 
3.2 Secession: For and Against 
Under the presumption of justified political power, I will now briefly consider the 
weightiest justice-based arguments in favour (and in disfavour) of secession. I base this 
section largely on the seminal work of Allen Buchanan (2004; 1997; 1991). Buchanan’s 
Just-Cause approach is still among the most influential theories of secession. It is 
therefore a natural point of reference. I will, however, only discuss those of his arguments 
that are relevant in the context of liberal-to-liberal secession16. Because these arguments 
are already established in the literature they will be presented here only in very brief 
fashion. Most space will be devoted to critical comments on my part.  
The arguments from ‘escaping discriminatory redistribution’ and ‘cultural 
preservation’ aim at generating a valid territorial claim on the part of the secessionists, 
whereas in the argument from ‘rectifying past injustices’ the secessionists are instead 
reclaiming their territorial sovereignty. Alongside each of these pro-arguments I will 
consider the weightiest contra-arguments. Also here I draw on Buchanan’s work. These 
                                                 
16 The most obvious justice-based argument for a unilateral right to secede, namely state violations of human rights, 
is thus not treated here. It should be beyond all doubt, however, that any liberal Just-Cause theory of secession will 
recognize the right of a group to secede if, as Buchanan puts it, “[t]he physical survival of its members is threatened 
by actions of the state […] or if it suffers violations of other basic human rights” (1997: 37). In addition, Buchanan 
has recently suggested that “serious and persisting violations of intrastate autonomy agreements by the state, as 
determined by a suitable international monitoring inquiry” can establish a secessionist right (2004: 357). This may 
also be a plausible candidate. However, the situations that ground these arguments can be reasonably assumed to fall 
outside the scope of liberal-to-liberal secession. I will therefore not attend to them here.  
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are the arguments from ‘preventing wrongful taking’ and ‘achieving distributive justice’. 
The former flows directly from the presumption of justified political power on the part of 
the liberal state, whereas the latter can be viewed as a specification of some important 
elements on which that justification turns.   
 
3.2.1 Escaping Discriminatory Redistribution 
According to Buchanan, one of the strongest arguments in favour of secession stems 
from the secessionists’ interest in escaping discriminatory redistribution (1991: 38-45). 
The state engages in discriminatory redistribution if it has been  
 
implementing taxation schemes or regulatory policies or economic programs that systematically work to the 
disadvantage of some groups, while benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways. A clear example of discriminatory 
redistribution would be the government imposing higher taxes on one group while spending less on it, or 
placing special economic restrictions on one region, without any sound moral justification for this unequal 
treatment (ibid.: 40).  
 
Under such circumstances, Buchanan claims, the disadvantaged groups may justly engage 
in oppositional behaviour. But how plausible is this? 
Consider the following scenario: Some of state A’s richest citizens, the Better-
Offs, inhabit a specific portion of A’s territory. For several decades, A’s welfare state 
policies – which include, inter alia, progressive taxation – have involved a substantial 
redistribution of resources from the Better-Offs to A’s poorer inhabitants of other 
regions, for the sake of equalising differences in natural as well as material endowments. 
Now, are the Better-Offs entitled to form a secessionist state on the topical territory, by 
virtue of the argument from escaping discriminatory redistribution? To this liberal 
egalitarians would say no. And their rationale would be the contra-secession argument 
from distributive justice.  
The condition of arbitrariness seemingly remains unsatisfied in the case of 
secession by the Better-Offs. In a welfare state it is indeed legitimate to systematically 
impose higher taxes on the wealthy. And as long as the extreme libertarian position is 
dismissed, then there is nothing theoretically inconsistent in imposing redistributive 
policies on the citizenry. The secessionists can, however, reply in two ways: Either they 
can claim that (1) the redistribution exceeds the demands of distributive justice, or they can 
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(2) question whether the seceding territory and its resources are subject to common 
ownership in the first place (Buchanan 1991: 16-7).  
Let me start by addressing (1). As Allen Buchanan has correctly pointed out, there 
is (i) widespread theoretical disagreement between theories of distributive justice as to how 
much redistribution is required (ibid.: 121). This is certainly the case also within the liberal 
egalitarian camp. Substantial disagreement exists concerning both the proper level of 
redistribution, as well as what to equalize (cf. e.g. Stark 2002). Furthermore, suggests 
Buchanan, even if we assume that such disagreements can be settled, (ii) the principles of 
redistribution will probably have to be formulated in such an abstract fashion “that it is 
difficult to determine their implications in concrete cases” (1991: 121).    
This essay would be led too far astray if it were to engage in a thorough treatment 
of various liberal egalitarian positions. I will therefore not provide any conclusory account 
of what a proper redistributive level and kind consist in. I believe, however, that various 
sound theories can be submitted. It should nonetheless be clear that liberal egalitarianism 
– regardless of version – is committed to redistributive practices. Redistribution is crucial 
to secure competency-rights, which are required to properly honour the liberal 
commitment to positive liberty (cf. Chapter 2).  
Further, concerning (ii), it does not seem impossible to come up with a method 
for determining application issues. Thomas Nagel, for one, asserts that it is possible to 
conduct a pairwise comparison between persons affected by a policy. The method 
consists in using what he calls ‘the impartial view’, which “comes from our capacity to 
take up a point of view which abstracts from who we are, but which appreciates fully and 
takes to heart the value of every person’s life and welfare” (1991: 64-5). It is Nagel’s belief 
that, “when this is done, on careful reflection, a ranking of urgency naturally emerges” 
(ibid.: 67-8).  
Nagel’s suggestion strikes me as rather uncontroversial. I will thus simply assume, 
without further argument, that (i) and (ii) do not pose an ultimate threat to the strength of 
the distributive justice argument. In most cases, the redistributive practices will (by a large 
margin) be in accordance with the demands of liberal egalitarian morality. Let me 
emphasize, though, that a separate calculation will have to be done in each particular case.  
To make it perfectly clear: I have not dismissed discriminatory redistribution as a 
relevant argument in favour of secession in instances where it is in fact satisfied. What I 
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have done, however, is to underline that (within liberal egalitarian morality) the demands 
of distributive justice are so high that factual redistribution (in most cases, if not all) will 
not approximate an unjust transfer of revenues. 
So, if I were correct in my dismissal of the plausibility of the first strategy, then the 
secessionists would have to resort to strategy (2): To sustain the force of the argument 
from discriminatory redistribution, they would have to ground it in an eventual unjust 
annexation by the state17. Note, however, that this reduces the argument from 
discriminatory redistribution to a special instance of the argument from rectifying past 
injustices, which I will address in the next section. 
Before leaving the outline of the argument from distributive justice the following 
should be noted: If the secessionists agree to sustain their transfer of revenue to the 
mother-state, then the argument from distributive justice no longer precludes the case for 
secession to the same extent (Buchanan 1991: 115, 123).  
 
3.2.2 Rectifying Past Injustices 
If a portion of the territory of the current liberal state was initially stolen from the 
secessionist group, then the latter seemingly possesses a valid claim to that territory. The 
idea is simple: Past injustices should be rectified. This argument carries an intuitive moral 
appeal. As Allen Buchanan puts it, in such cases “secession is simply the reappropriation, 
by the legitimate owner, of stolen property” (1991: 67). 
There is a problem, however. On the above interpretation, the impalpable 
implication that no existing states would qualify as justified wielders of political power 
seems inevitable. It is a sad historical fact that (more or less) all existing states, including 
modern liberal democracies, have been established through forceful annexations or other 
sorts of unjust conquering in the past (either by themselves or some sort of predecessors). 
                                                 
17 The following point is somewhat related to that strategy: What if taxation has occurred (for some while) without a 
subsequent redistribution of revenue? On Buchanan’s view, this scenario would render the transfers unjust, and thus 
ground a case for secession founded on the argument from escaping discriminatory redistribution (1991: 157). 
Consequently, or so it may seem, the argument from distributive justice is weakened. But how much leverage does 
this resort add to the picture? I find it reasonable to demand that the secessionists’ claim should be subject to a moral 
statute of limitations. (I will elaborate on this sort of requirement soon, in relation to the argument from rectificatory 
justice (cf. 3.2.2 immediately below).) And, because I only consider well-established liberal welfare states (which 
usually have been around for quite a while) it will become clear that the argument from discriminatory redistribution 
does not gather any substantial momentum no matter how discriminatory the state’s redistribution may have been at 
the outset.   
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This notwithstanding, our intuitions seem to suggest that it is somewhat unreasonable to 
thereby render them as unconditionally unjustified.  
What is doing the moral work here is the idea of a moral statute of limitations: If the 
unjust taking occurred long ago, then the moral force of the rectificatory-justice argument 
is proportionally reduced. Note that it is not the passing of time itself that does the 
weakening, but rather the value of ensuring international stability. Following Buchanan, 
“[t]o fail to acknowledge a moral statute of limitations would produce unacceptable 
disruption of the international order, with endless recriminations about ancient wrongs 
vying for priority” (ibid.: 88). A problem with this approach is the difficulty that pertains 
to determining a reasonable point of impact. Buchanan does not himself venture on such 
an attempt, although he suggests that it “would certainly have to be more than one 
lifetime” (ibid.: 89). Indeed, it is wise, I think, to not be more explicit when speaking in 
general terms. A reasonable limit should instead be decided on a case-to-case basis.    
So, what can we conclude from this? Given that a relevant moral statute of 
limitations is determined, and that the secessionists’ claim falls short of satisfying that 
threshold, then, the (adequately functioning) liberal state has a valid claim to its whole 
territory. To see this, one can consider the argument from preventing wrongful taking. This 
contra-secession argument spells out the following simple fact: In the topical situation, 
secession would constitute a wrongful taking of a portion of the territory that is currently 
claimed (in valid fashion) by the state (Buchanan 1991: 104-14).  
 
3.2.3 The Preservation of Culture 
In Secession Allen Buchanan includes the preservation of culture as one of the arguments 
that can go into an all-things-considered case in favour of secession. Even though, as he 
claims, the argument is rather weak on its own, he nevertheless suggests that it may add 
leverage to the conclusory case for a right to secede (1991: 52-64, 151-5). I will now 
identify a deficiency in Buchanan’s account of this pro-secession argument, which 
invalidates it for our purposes. 
Buchanan identifies a set of conditions that must “be satisfied if the argument 





(1) The culture in question must in fact be imperiled. (2) Less disruptive ways of preserving the culture 
(e.g., special minority group rights within the existing state) must be unavailable or inadequate. (3) The 
culture in question must meet minimal standards of justice (unlike Nazi culture or the culture of the 
Khmer Rouge). (4) The seceding cultural group must not be seeking independence in order to establish an 
illiberal state, that is, one which fails to uphold basic individual civil and political rights, and from which 
free exit is denied. (5) Neither the state nor any third party can have a valid claim to the seceding territory 
(1991: 61). 
 
It is interesting to note how restrictive condition (5) really is. In light of what we have 
already discussed above, unless the secessionists can advance a claim of unjust annexation 
of territory on the part of the state (and, given that their territorial claim is not overridden 
by a moral statute of limitations), the liberal democratic state will have a valid claim to 
territory: Under the rationalistic model, adequately functioning liberal states are justified 
wielders of political power.  
It thus becomes clear that the argument from cultural preservation cannot work at all 
as an argument for secession from a well-functioning liberal state. As it is not able to 
generate a valid territorial claim on its own, it is indeed redundant. And Buchanan himself 
concedes explicitly that the argument is only capable of justifying secession in cases where 
no clear title to the territory exists (1991: 61, 153-4).  
Interestingly, Buchanan’s own account of political power – on which he indirectly 
relies in Secession (1991), and (as seen above) states more explicitly in Justice, Legitimacy, and 
Self-Determination (2004) – is of the rationalistic type. And when the issue at hand is liberal-
to-liberal secession, Buchanan must (for the sake of theoretical consistency) either 
abandon (5) and then consequently seek to demonstrate how a territorial claim can be 
generated by the cultural preservation argument, or he must disqualify the preservation of 
culture as an argument for secession. Put differently, in the case of secession from an 
adequately functioning liberal state, the argument from cultural preservation is powerless in 
justifying secession, unless condition (5) is already fulfilled by the argument from rectifying 
past injustices. But in such a case the former argument is not doing any relevant work at 




3.3 Concluding Remarks: A Just-Cause Theory of Secession 
This chapter has defended a theory of secession grounded in injustices. The Just-Cause 
approach has been presented as the natural way for liberal egalitarians to accommodate a 
right to secede. This right is, however, a very limited one. Secession from a liberal state 
can be justified if (1) the secessionists have suffered the wrongful taking of territory, and a 
moral statute of limitations is satisfied. Further, a secessionist right can be granted if (2) 
the state’s redistribution of resources exceeds the demands of distributive justice. In 
practice, however, this latter justification will (almost) never apply in the case of secession 
from well-established liberal welfare states.  
We have further seen that (3) a right to secede cannot be justified by sole reference 
to the need to preserve a culture. The following should be emphasized, however: Even 
though liberals must deny cultural preservation as a valid argument for secession, it need not 
fail to justify intra-state autonomy arrangements. As Buchanan rightly points out, liberal 
morality has a presumption in favour of nonsecessionist solutions for preserving minority 
cultures. The rationale is that this would ensure that the liberal state “retains ultimate 
control over entry to and exit from illiberal enclave communities within its borders, 
[which implies that] individuals will have some freedom of choice to participate in these 
communities or not” (1991: 59).  I will return to the issue of intra-state autonomy in the 
next chapter. 
The next chapter will also consider the most persuasive liberal alternative to the 
Just-Cause approach. Let me stress again that the presumption of justified political power 
(which has grounded the theory of secession outlined in this chapter) is still exactly that – 
a presumption. In the rest of this essay I will therefore be at pains to fulfil the second part 
of the Tension-Requirement. I will argue that the alternative candidate for a liberal theory 
of secession, namely the Choice approach (which is grounded in the principle of 
individual political liberty), is less compatible with liberal egalitarianism. This will further 
establish the Just-Cause alternative as the proper liberal approach to secession. 
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If I have thus far been on target, then it should be clear that the heading of this chapter is 
now rather misleading. That which appeared (in Section 2.4.1) as a promising approach to 
establish a permissive liberal theory of secession – grounded in a pure voluntaristic model 
of political power – is now cast in dimmer light. The presumption of political liberty 
seems to falter. 
 I will now, however, address an attempt to resist that latter conclusion. Firstly, I 
will briefly outline the main thesis of a novel Choice-approach, which seems able to fulfil 
the first part of the Tension-Requirement. If so, this appears to move us towards a more 
level playing field for the two liberal approaches to secession. However, to outperform 
the Just-Cause approach, the Choice-theory must also demonstrate that it does a better job 
in honouring liberal commitments. The main part of this chapter will discuss its 
arguments to that effect.  
 
4.1 Christopher Wellman’s Permissive Theory of Secession 
Christopher Heath Wellman (2005; 1995) has recently developed a sophisticated 
argument to show why liberals should be inclined to take a quite permissive stance 
towards recognizing a right to secession. His theory is as plain as it is intuitively 
compelling.  
On Wellman’s view, all “groups [that are] able and willing to perform the requisite 
political functions” have a right to secede (2005: 64). The only additional requirement is 
that the remaining state must also be able to function adequately. This theory follows, so 
he claims, from valuing self-determination, while at the same time recognizing that the 
justification of political power must be made conditional upon functional requirements.  
To his credit, Wellman is sensitive to the deficiencies associated with relying on a 
pure voluntaristic model of justification. His hybrid account explicitly restricts the latitude 
of the secessionists: Secession cannot be justified if it jeopardizes fixed standards of good 
government. This is interesting. By incorporating such a rationalistic element in his model 
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of justification Wellman goes a long way in fulfilling the first part of the Tension-
Requirement. Consequently, the presumption in favour of the rationalistic model of 
justification, which thus far has vindicated Just-Cause theory as the proper liberal 
approach to secession, is now being challenged.  
Having said that, it will take more for Wellman’s theory to establish itself as the 
best liberal approach to secession. To achieve this, he must also fulfil the second part of 
the Tension-Requirement. This implies showing that liberal egalitarians should choose his 
hybrid model of justification, rather than the pure rationalistic approach to political 
power. Wellman offers two rationales for why his hybrid account is to be preferred. In 
what follows I will discuss their leverage and how the partisans of Just Cause-theory may 
reply. 
 
4.2 Wellman’s Criticism of a Pure Rationalistic Model   
There might be a significant problem with the rationalistic account of political power. If 
one uses a purely functional measure of justification, then there is seemingly nothing to 
prevent this account from theoretically allowing for forceful annexation of other states. 
Wellman claims that this impalpable implication is inevitable, and therefore rejects the 
pure functional (or what he calls ‘teleological’) model. His argument proceeds in two 
steps. Writes Wellman: 
 
[T]he teleological approach allows secessionist parties to claim a right to secede grounded in efficiency. 
[…] Suppose, for instance, that Alaska might be able to provide more efficiently for itself than the United 
States as a whole currently does, and that the United States without Alaska would be a more efficient 
political unit because of its more manageable size and increased contiguity (1995: 157-8).    
 
If that were the case, holds Wellman, a right to secede is consistent with, and would 
indeed be required by, the pure functional model of political power. This insight leads 
him to develop his criticism:   
 
[I]f the teleological justification for the state entails that secession is justified when the new political 
arrangement will be more efficient, then it also justifies forcible annexations under analogous 
circumstances. For instance, if Alaska’s claim to its territory outweighs the United States’ claim in those 
cases in which the former could better perform the state’s functions, then it follows that the United States 
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could forcibly annex Canada if the new union could better perform its governmental function in Canada 
than Canada currently does. But this just seems wrong. […] If Canadians prefer to remain independent of 
the United States then the latter would not be justified in forcibly annexing the former despite any 
possible increases in efficiency (ibid.: 159-60). 
 
To avoid this implication, Wellman endorses a hybrid model, in which the justified 
wielding of political power is made dependent upon not only (i) functional requirements, but 
(ii) actual consent as well. Obviously, by including (ii) it becomes easy to circumvent the 
theoretical sanctioning of a forceful annexation of Canada: As long as the justification of 
the prospective new state is made conditional on the consent of the Canadians, then a 
forceful annexation cannot be theoretically sustained as long as they oppose unification. 
The post-annexation state would simply lack the consensus required for the justified 
wielding of political power. Thus, the introduction of a consensual element is Wellman’s 
way of responding to the putative deficiency of a purely functional model.  
How can the rationalistic approach meet Wellman’s criticism? One intuitively 
sound strategy would be to dispute whether the topical consequences would in fact come 
about. There seems to be obvious moral prohibitions against forcefully acquiring other 
states. The point is that liberals value peace and stability. For instance, when facing 
illiberal regimes it would not be the proper liberal response to simply sanction forceful 
acquisition. As Brian Barry puts it, 
 
[a]t any rate, liberals are not so simple-minded as to imagine that the answer to all violations of liberal 
rights is to send in the Marines, or even a United Nations force. As in any just war theory, there must be 
some doctrine of ‘proportionality’ (2001: 138). 
 
It seems rather straightforward to assume that liberals would back that description. And 
as long as the valuing of peace and stability can be grounded in liberal principles this is a 
sound strategy. Let us call it the strategy of elaboration (of a normative position)18.  
But does this point manage, by itself, to save the pure rationalistic model of 
political power? It may not do so. Even though the virtuous adherence to peace and 
stability may be incorporated in liberal theory – which implies that liberal morality, all-
                                                 
18 I will not discuss the plausibility of Barry’s elaboration of liberal morality. The only point to note here is that the 




things-considered, will not sanction forceful annexation – one may object that it does 
nothing to alter the unfortunate theoretical implications of the topical model of political 
power itself. The United States would still be justified in annexing Alaska, and the latter 
could likewise be justified in seceding from the former. In both cases the justification 
would be based on a prospective increase in efficiency.  
There is, however, a significant flaw in this objection to the strategy of elaboration. 
For the objection to work one must assume that Wellman’s own assessment of the pure 
functional model does not make any reference to the substantial content of (liberal) morality. 
It can be shown, I think, that this is not the case with Wellman. 
His rationale for rejecting the model is its unfortunate consequences. What does this 
imply? Firstly, it means that forceful annexation violates the principle of political liberty. 
Secondly, this is unfortunate because freedom of political association is valuable to (each 
of) the citizens of the annexed state. Note that without these implicit assumptions (about 
value) Wellman’s assessment of the model would not have a basis19. Put differently: The 
palpability of a pure functional model of political power cannot be assessed in isolation 
from a more substantial account of what it is that possesses moral value. This is a fundamental 
requirement of political philosophy. If one does not clarify value attributions, then moral 
deliberation cannot even get off the ground. 
 To see clearer why this deficiency in Wellman’s criticism is significant, consider the 
following analogy: To assess the plausibility of, for instance, a rights-based approach in 
normative argumentation, it would not suffice for invalidating it to claim that (A) its 
implementation would have unfortunate consequences for human well-being. Instead one 
would have to (B) criticise the approach in a more formal and fundamental way, for 
instance by arguing that the very existence of rights – as a concept – is implausible. The 
point is that the former strategy would have to be based on an implicit assumption about 
the content of the topical rights. And, to be able to say something about the eventual 
negative consequences of implementing that (particular and specified) rights-regime, it is 
necessary to make assumptions about value, which is impossible without invoking the 
framework of a substantial morality. It is not enough to spell out the consequences. One 
must also show why they are negative.  
                                                 
19 Note that it is not important whether I am precisely on target in describing Wellman’s own assumptions here. The 
crucial point is rather that his assessment must rely on assumptions about value. 
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Let me elaborate with an example: Imagine that a rights-regime specifies an equal 
right to live in something that resembles a Hobbesian “state of nature”, in which each 
person has the liberty to pursue one’s own interests as seen fit20. The sole function of the 
government (if at all necessary) would be to ensure that its “citizens” are equally endowed 
with that (tragic) liberty. That regime would obviously be impalpable from a liberal 
perspective, because it opens up for nothing else than a survival-of-the-fittest right. 
Lockean property rights are not in place. Redistributive schemes for compensating 
variations in natural endowments are likewise missing, to name only a few deficiencies. 
Thus, a more extensive rights regime would obviously have to be implemented to satisfy 
the political philosophy of liberal egalitarianism. This speaks for itself. The subtler lesson, 
however, is that to be able to make that assessment in the first place, it was necessary to 
consult the substantial content of liberal morality.  
And what conclusions would the liberal draw from this particular rendition of a 
rights-based theory? Clearly it would be deemed as deficient. But would its deficiency also 
go some way in disqualifying the plausibility of rights-based approaches in general? Of 
course it would not. In fact, if that were the case, then liberal theory – which is commonly 
cast as a rights-based approach – would be invalidated by way of a rather poor, or even 
outrightly misplaced, argument. Similarly, Wellman cannot claim that a pure functional 
approach to political power is generally invalidated by the negative consequences that are 
assumed to follow from (what turns out to be nothing more than) a particular version of it.  
As goes for strategy B, its critique would be strictly formal, and thus not subject to 
this line of criticism. Not so for Wellman. To make it clear: His critique is indisputably 
relying on implicit assumptions about value, which means that he invokes elements of a 
substantial normative position. He thereby exemplifies strategy A. And as he does not 
build a case for why it makes sense to shut out other moral considerations that belong to 
the same topical position (which for Wellman is liberalism), his argument cannot reply to 
the objection I have just developed. 
So, it appears that the strategy of elaboration may not be so unconvincing after all. 
When substantial notions of liberal morality are made part of the assessment in the first 
                                                 
20 Consider, for instance, Hobbes’s (in)famous phrasings in Leviathan, where he describes “the Liberty each man 
hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the Preservation of his own Nature” as “a Right to every thing, 
even to one anothers body” (1975 [1651]: 66-7, quoted in Malnes 1988: 65). The subtlety and nuances of Hobbes 
argument when read in whole is not relevant here. I only borrow his description of a person’s natural freedom in a 
state of nature to illustrate what the content of an extremely narrow rights-regime could be.  
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place, then, why not also bring in liberalism’s preference for peace and international 
stability? One may, however, object that the inclusion of such considerations can only fit 
into a (too) broad and diluted liberal morality. A liberal theory of secession should ground 
its arguments in principles that are more genuinely liberal. I concede that this objection has 
some merit. I will therefore consider a similar rationale for dismantling Wellman’s 
criticism. But it will now be clearly grounded in central liberal principles. Keep in mind 
that the vital question is now whether or not a liberal egalitarian version of a pure 
functional model of justification can avoid the sanctioning of forceful annexations. 
The most intuitive response would probably be that this question could quite 
easily be answered in the affirmative: If one simply demands that a central requirement for the 
justified wielding of political power is to abstain from annexing other justified states, then the model 
seems to be saved. Call this suggestion S. The vital contribution on the part of S is the 
specification of the functional requirements for justification. That set of requirements 
now includes respecting the self-determination of other states, (at least) as long as those 
states themselves fulfil the same set of functional requirements. Thus, the model of 
political power would still be defined in purely functional terms, yet it would not contain 
the seedbed for justifying forceful annexations. Even better, the rationale for this would 
be developed from the nucleus of liberal morality: Indeed, the source would be the very 
same central liberal principle on which Wellman builds his whole theory, namely, the 
principle of political liberty.  
Recall from Chapter 2 that liberal morality is fundamentally concerned with 
protecting the interests of individuals; it adheres to ethical individualism. In addition, due 
to its universalism, liberal morality does not differentiate between the citizens of different 
states. Their interests are equally valuable. Therefore it seems obvious that the interests of 
the individuals in state A (i.e. to remain politically independent) must be weighed against 
the interests of those in state B (which might be, say, to acquire new territory that helps 
them develop long-desired luxurious leisure activities). And if the competing interests are 
as suggested, then it seems reasonable to assume that the relative importance of the 
former will clearly outweigh that of the latter. Note that this expands the question of 
justified political power from applying only to the intra-state context (i.e. concerning the 
proper moral relationship between the state and its citizens), into also applying in the 
inter-state context.  
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Thus, to put it straightforward, a liberal state is not justified (on the functional 
model) unless it respects the current political liberty of (the citizens of) other states. This 
liberty is dependent upon those states themselves satisfying the topical set of functional 
requirements. When so doing, they are recognized as justified wielders of political power, 
and thus have nothing to fear in terms of being forcefully annexed by (other) liberal 
states.  
Put differently, it seems unnecessary to turn one’s model of justified political 
power into a (partially) voluntaristic one for the sake of circumventing the topical forceful 
annexations. By introducing a threshold for functional justification, which is meaningful 
and non-ad hoc (from the perspective of liberal morality), the rationalistic approach can 
meet this criticism. Consequently, Choice-theorists must look elsewhere for a proper 
vindication of their own position. 
As long as the obligation to abstain from annexation is contingent upon the other 
state performing a fixed set of functions properly, it is mandatory to equip the model of 
political power with a concrete measure for minimal justification. To be more specific, the 
state would have to endow its citizens with a set of liberal rights that were equal to, or 
more comprehensive than, a certain minimal set. It is not my aim here to fully specify the 
content of that set, but I assume that such a threshold can be identified. It is my view that 
the exact specification of a meaningful threshold should be done on a case-to-case basis. 
But, once a relevant limit is specified and met, then the theoretical sanctioning of the 
topical forceful annexations would be circumvented. Central principles of liberal morality 
would quite simply ban it. 
Indeed, Wellman entertains (something like) that idea himself. He nevertheless 
rejects it for the following reason:  
 
If the sole feature grounding a state’s claim to its territory is that the state’s presence in this region serves a 
vital function, it seems ad hoc to assert that the state maintains this claim as long as it performs this 
function merely adequately. […] [I]t seems natural that any competitor better able to perform the very same 
function would thereby extinguish or outweigh the existing state’s claim (1995: 158). 
 
Here, however, it goes wrong for Wellman. As we have just seen above, to be able to 
meaningfully assess a functional model of justification one must specify the content of the 
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whole set of functions. Therefore, to reiterate, Wellman does not fully acknowledge that a 
threshold requirement is not theoretically ad hoc on the liberal egalitarian version of the pure 
functional model. What’s more: As seen in Chapter 2, it is a crucial liberal idea that an 
individual should be free to live her life as she sees fit, as long as her choices meet certain 
standards of competence. When viewed in an abstract way, this strikes me as quite 
analogous to the account I have just outlined. The idea of thresholds is uncontroversial 
and indeed necessary within liberal morality. 
So, thus far it seems that when one’s account of the rationalistic approach is 
relevantly substantiated, it is capable of theoretically circumventing the impalpable 
consequences that Wellman ascribes to it. I will now turn to developing a further 
argument for why it is not theoretically ad hoc to operate with a threshold for minimal 
(functional) performance. The argument is firmly rooted in liberal egalitarian judgments, 
but it also has resonance, I believe, with a wider range of reasonable moralities. 
 
4.3 Rewarding Terrorism 
Consider the following scenario: A liberal democratic state has been ridden by a violent 
conflict with a numerically small, yet persistent, secessionist group. The latter party (or, 
perhaps, rather a fraction of it) has engaged in, and still pursues, terrorist activities, which 
consequently disrupt public order and leave large parts of the citizenry in fear of being 
victims of an attack. Obviously, this reduces the state’s capability for providing its citizens 
with a daily life that is free from violent physical threats, let alone the accompanying 
psychological pains of distress and anxiety. Thus, one of the state’s important legitimising 
functions is challenged.  
Now, according to Wellman’s interpretation of what is implied by a pure 
functional model of political power, the secessionists would be justified in seceding given 
that they could establish a polity in which the performance of the relevant legitimising 
functions would be enhanced. In other words, they would be allowed to secede and 
establish a separatist state, in which the terrorist activities would (obviously) come to an 
end, which implies that efficiency has increased, and thus that their secession would be 
justified. In addition, the mother state would also enhance its efficiency, in the sense of 
simply being alleviated from disruptions of public order. 
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I am convinced, however, that the implications shown in this thought experiment 
will fly in the face of any sound moral theory. To put it bluntly, one should not be 
rewarded for pursuing terrorism. I take this to be a persistent and strong judgment. And it 
constitutes, I believe, another rationale for why it is theoretically necessary to incorporate a 
threshold for sufficient performance into a functional model of political power. It is not ad 
hoc; on the contrary, it is required (by our considered judgments). Any sound theory of 
secession must accommodate the belief that terrorism should not turn out to be 
rewarding21.   
Of course, one may object that my example instead should be interpreted as (in 
some way) further demonstrating Wellman’s point, namely, that a pure functional model 
of political power – which is solely based on efficiency measures – is indeed impalpable. 
That is not the proper interpretation, however, for the following reason: As I have argued 
above, any assessment of the liberal egalitarian version of the pure rationalistic model must 
take into account the range of normative principles belonging to the topical moral 
position. When paired up with that assumption, it becomes clear that the example of 
rewarding terrorism provides a further reason for incorporating a threshold for sufficient 
performance into our model, rather than undermining the model itself. 
Moreover, apart from flying in the face of liberal egalitarian judgments, a 
threshold-free functional model of political power would also obviously run the risk of 
creating perverse incentives on the part of the secessionists: If you get a bomb, you might 
get a state. 
Let me emphasize that Wellman’s hybrid model would perhaps to some extent 
lower the number of such terrorist-laden conflicts. But does this sole (and rather 
consequentialist) point suffice to persuade liberals to endorse the Choice approach? I 
think not. It is a feeble reason for making such a drastic move as the endorsement of a 
Choice-right to secede actually is. What’s more: If we are really concerned with not 
rewarding terrorism (or the threat of such), then we should instead be firm in our 
rejection of a Choice-right; that is, if we abandon the rationalistic model of justification 
for the sole reason of avoiding eventual terrorist activities, then isn’t this (in a tragic sense) 
a huge (or even the ultimate) “reward” to the terrorists? At the very least, liberals should 
                                                 
21This norm should only be abandoned in exceptional cases, such as when concessions to the terrorists would be 
necessary to avoid massive deterioration of human well-being. For example, this could apply in the face of terrorists 
who possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons.  
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postpone their all-things-considered judgment until we have surveyed Wellman’s second 
rationale for voluntarism, and the possible rationalist reply.   
 
4.4 The Hybrid Model and Individual Political Liberty 
If my argument thus far has been sound, then voluntarism cannot be brought into 
Wellman’s model by claiming that the rival rationalist approach unavoidably sanctions 
forceful annexations. It simply does not. However, a (slightly) different rationale may still 
show that a liberal model of justification should incorporate voluntaristic elements: It 
holds that Wellman’s hybrid model is somehow called for by the principle of individual 
political liberty itself (or what he calls ‘individual autonomy’).  
Wellman is explicit about his theory being a conditional one: “If you value self-
determination, then you should endorse secessionist rights” (2005: 38). On his view, this 
valuing of group autonomy is what follows from the “modest and plausible” assumption 
that “other things being equal, people should be left free to be the authors of their own 
lives” (ibid.: 2). Of course, as liberal egalitarians, it is hard to be opposed to that 
assumption when it is spelled out in such a general form. As seen earlier, liberal morality 
acknowledges the value of an individual’s free choice. Put simply, this can be traced to the 
negative conception of liberty, which vindicates the commitment to individual political 
liberty. This commitment is uncontroversial. However, as I will now argue, Wellman’s 
second rationale runs into problems as it tries to trade too much on that commitment.  
 As seen in Section 2.2, group rights can be accommodated within liberalism’s 
value-individualist framework as long as those rights are given an individualistic 
justification. Given this, it is easy to see how group rights can be instrumentally valuable. 
There are, however, some group rights that seem to demand intrinsic valuing, such as the 
right to democratic governance. Writes Wellman,   
 
[i]t is widely held that democracy brings about the best consequences, but most believe that the case for 
democracy does not depend solely, or even principally, upon its instrumental value. […] [P]eople have a 





Under the premise of justificatory individualism, however, it is not possible to 
straightforwardly ascribe intrinsic value to collective rights. To be able to posit 
deontological reasons for valuing democracy, a connection between individual autonomy 
(which has intrinsic value) and democracy would have to be established.  
Such a connection could have been demonstrated if it were possible to assert that 
an individual is self-governing when she participates in the process of democratic 
decision-making. But, as Buchanan (1998: 17-8) has persuasively argued, that assertion 
fails because one is simply not exercising self-rule when so doing; one is rather governed 
by the majority. In other words, it is not possible to ascribe intrinsic value to democracy 
(by way of that rationale) because democratic participation cannot be viewed as a 
straightforward extension of individual autonomy. There is a gap between the two.  
Yet, says Wellman, we continue to believe that democracy is in fact intrinsically 
valuable, even though we apparently know of no way to prove this within a value-
individualist framework. And this is where his argument becomes compelling. A central 
strategy for renouncing Choice-theories of secession that are grounded in the principle of 
individual autonomy has namely been to invoke the very same “gap-problem”. And while 
Wellman concedes that such a gap exists between “valuing individual autonomy and 
valuing the group autonomy necessary to justify secessionist rights”, he counters the 
objection as follows: Because “the very same gap” confronts us as proponents of 
democracy, then “[a]s a consequence, we cannot consistently cite this problem as a 
decisive argument against secessionist rights unless we similarly indict the case for 
democracy” (2005: 53-4). Call this proposition (i).  
Here we have arrived at the core of Wellman’s second strategy for justifying a 
(partially) voluntaristic account of political power. To vindicate a Choice-right to secede 
one must recognize that group self-determination (or autonomy) is intrinsically valuable. 
But rather than offering a direct defence for a Choice-right, Wellman indirectly 
substantiates its plausibility by pointing to the negative theoretical consequences that 
follow from not allowing for intrinsically valuing group autonomy: For the sake of 
theoretical consistency one would (lamentably) also have to deny that democracy is 
intrinsically valuable. 
Put differently, unless one grants a Choice-right to secede (and accordingly 
recognizes that the model of justified political power is (partially) voluntaristic), one must 
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be willing, so it seems, to renounce the intrinsic value of democracy. In addition, as 
Wellman sees it, one must also deny both that (ii) “there are nonconsequential reasons 
against forcibly colonizing others”, and that (iii) “legitimate states are entitled to an 
appropriate degree of sovereignty” (ibid.: 55).  
It should be clear from Section 4.2 that (ii) can be accommodated within a purely 
rationalistic model. Recall that a justified state (under that model) enjoys sovereignty in its 
relations with other well-functioning states because each state’s justification depends 
(among other conditions) upon renouncing forceful annexations of other well-functioning 
states. One need not include an element of actual-consent to get this result. A unilateral 
Choice-right to secede, on the other hand, is crucially dependent upon a (partially) 
voluntaristic model of justification. But if forceful annexations can be avoided without 
invoking a voluntaristic model of political power, then, (ii) cannot help to ground a 
Choice-right to secede. Further, it seems quite achievable to dismantle (iii) by way of 
similar reasoning. If so, then Wellman is left with (i) in his attempt to justify secessionist 
rights. But how plausible is proposition (i)? 
 Wellman establishes the urgency of intrinsically valuing group autonomy by 
utilizing an uncontroversial example, namely the view that we have deontological reasons 
to value democracy. Further, he argues that this kind of group autonomy (which enables 
us to value democracy) is similar to that required to ground a right to secede. Thus, so it 
goes, if we want to defend democracy, then we must acknowledge the value of this strong 
group autonomy; and, consequently, we must also grant a Choice-right to secede. Indeed, 
as Wellman sees it, democracy and secession have a mutual normative basis: 
 
On reflection, it should come as no surprise that the arguments on behalf of democracy and secession 
share the same lacuna because, in the end, plebiscitary rights to secede [i.e. Choice-rights] are merely an 
extension of democratic governance to the issue of territorial boundaries (Wellman 2005: 54).   
 
The shared ‘lacuna’ is the commitment to individual political liberty.  
Interestingly, Wellman has only addressed how we can be justified in intrinsically valuing 




is admittedly counterintuitive and the burden of argument therefore falls on anyone who would invoke 
considerations in tension with it, but the implications for democracy, colonization, and the forcible 
annexation of legitimate states provide the requisite argument. In other words, because the implications of 
denying the deontological value of group self-determination are less palatable than embracing a premise 
that may conflict with value-individualism, these implications enable one to shoulder the burden of 
argument […] that value-collectivists must bear (2005: 55). 
 
Put differently, we are justified in valuing this strong group autonomy because the case 
for intrinsically valuing democracy depends upon it.  
One may agree with this or not. It nevertheless does not matter. Wellman’s 
argument in favour of a voluntaristic model of political power is deficient simply because 
it presumes that once the intrinsic value of group autonomy is justified (by drawing on the 
democracy example), a primary right to secede is also established. But this is a rushed 
conclusion. Clearly, such valuing is a necessary condition for justifying a Choice-right, but 
it does not follow (without further substantiation) that it is also a sufficient condition. In 
other words, Wellman lacks a rationale for why the proper valuing of that autonomy 
requires recognizing secession.  
Even though both democracy (D) and a Choice-right to secede (S) may perhaps be 
shown to share the same normative ‘lacuna’, they are nevertheless different concepts. 
Their (separate) vindication is dependent upon an all-things-considered evaluation of how 
they can be properly fitted into liberal morality. Thus, if liberal egalitarianism is capable of 
providing a weighty rationale for why individual political liberty should not ground S, then 
it is possible to reject S. But the prospective rejection of S need not imply that we must 
also reject D. My suggestion is rather that it is possible to value the strong group 
autonomy necessary to ground both concepts, but nevertheless argue that other moral 
reasons may outweigh our prima facie vindication (grounded in our valuing of group 
autonomy) of D, S, or both.  
S is, however, the most plausible candidate for being outweighed in that fashion. 
To elaborate: There are several ways in which the (abstract) idea of group autonomy can be 
properly honoured short of allowing for a redrawing of territorial boundaries. That is, 
even if we agree to initially acknowledge the intrinsic value of (strong) autonomy for 
group G, it remains an open question whether this initial prima facie valuing should lead us 
to recognize a right for G to secede, rather than to enjoy some other form of enhanced self-rule, 
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such as intra-state autonomy arrangements. Group autonomy is valuable, but its proper 
form must be determined after exploring the impact of the various feasible solutions on 
other important liberal commitments.  
In contrast, it seems unlikely that one or more cogent (and relevant) rationales can 
be developed (from liberal morality) for why we should prefer other forms of government to 
democracy.  
So, it appears that we need not address the validity of Wellman’s justification for 
valuing group autonomy at all. His argument fails because he does not substantiate his 
assumption of what that autonomy amounts to. To sustain the force of his argument, he 
must show why intra-state autonomy arrangements cannot sufficiently honour group self-
determination. But, as we shall now see, liberal egalitarian morality (to Wellman’s 
misfortune) seems ripe with rationales for why intra-state solutions should be the 
preferred way to accommodate secessionist demands for self-rule. 
The liberal commitment to freedom of association does not in itself sanction the 
most extreme form of political liberty, which is secession. As Allen Buchanan puts it: 
 
It is one thing to say that persons within a polity have the right to associate together for political or 
religious purposes; it is another to say that this same right includes the right to take territory that is 
claimed by others. […] To say that the right to freedom of association includes the right to alter 
jurisdictional boundaries (meta-jurisdictional authority) by taking territory, is to trade on the 
uncontroversial liberal credentials of this right, but only by stretching its meaning unconscionably. When 
liberals say that the right to freedom of association is unquestionably among the rights any political order 
ought to respect, they have in mind the freedom of persons to associate with each other within a 
jurisdiction, not the right to take territory to form a new jurisdiction unilaterally (2003: 255).  
 
I think Buchanan is right on target. Clearly, this places the burden of proof on the 
Choice-theorist to explain why individual political liberty should nonetheless be 
interpreted as grounding a secessionist right.  
Now, as I alluded to in Chapter 2: If the commitment to individual political liberty 
is spelled out in its ultimate – justification-conferring – form (which renders political 
power voluntaristic), then it may ground a Choice-right to secede. However, I also 
suggested (in Sections 3.1.2-4) that this radical interpretation of individual political liberty 
is outweighed out of consideration for other liberal egalitarian commitments. The 
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rationale for this was the need to avoid the eradication of the commitment to fixed 
standards of good government. Thus, on balance, liberal morality should endorse a more 
modest interpretation. Put differently, if self-determination for groups is intrinsically 
valuable, then it should be accommodated by way of granting intra-state autonomy. 
 It is interesting to note that Wellman is capable of replying to this first objection. 
As seen in 4.1 above, his Choice-theory does offer a rationale for how the topical liberal 
commitments can be balanced: By requiring that both post-secession polities are able to 
function properly, the commitment to fixed standards of good government is saved. I 
think that reply is somewhat sustainable. This is important. The partisans of Just-Cause 
theory must thus concede that a crucial premise in their earlier rejection of the pure 
voluntaristic approach to political power (which yielded the vindication of the Just-Cause 
approach) is significantly challenged. Consequently, one is forced to look elsewhere for a 
convincing rationale for why individual political liberty should nevertheless be interpreted 
in a modest form.  
Fortunately, there are some good candidates to that effect. And both are 
developed from the midst of liberal morality. In the next section I discuss the argument 
from securing the legitimate interests of the nonsecessionists (who live on the secessionist territory). The 
second rationale will be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
4.5 Securing the Legitimate Interests of the Nonsecessionists   
If the principle of political liberty is to function as the normative basis for a Choice-right 
to secede, then one must assume that the secessionists themselves can be identified as the 
proper constituency for a vote on secession. Even though this matter may initially seem 
straightforward, on closer examination the picture gets blurrier.  
When applied to non-ideal cases, Wellman concedes that his theory must accept 
some deviation from the idea of (unanimous) actual consent. No matter how one draws 
new territorial lines there will inevitably be a minority of nonsecessionists among the 
larger secessionist group. Thus, when faced with the dim prospects for a consensual vote, 
Wellman favours a simple majority in two referenda as the second-best option. The first 
plebiscite initiates the process of separation. The second determines whether the 
secession is still preferred after its terms have been negotiated (2005: 60-3).      
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Interestingly, at this point Wellman seemingly runs into a problem of theoretical 
inconsistency. To him, a central argument for endorsing a partially voluntaristic account 
of justification is the value of consensual participation in political institutions. (This 
requirement of unanimity enabled him, e.g., to avoid forceful annexations, cf. 4.2.) Note 
that the principle of freedom of association is thereby used in the sense that unanimous 
actual consent is required for justification on the part of the mother-state. When we call 
attention to the prospective secessionist state, however, the unanimity-requirement 
(which makes a primary right to secede possible in the first place) is altered. In the latter 
context, justification can be established by the consent of a majority. (For Wellman it is not 
even compulsory with a ‘qualified’ (two-thirds) majority; a ‘simple’ (51 per cent) majority 
is regarded as sufficient.) The principle of political liberty is thus interpreted in a more 
modest way.  
But this is problematic. As long as majoritarianism is sufficient to establish 
territorial sovereignty on the part of the secessionists (given that a vote is cast among the 
inhabitants of the secessionist territory), then, Wellman needs to provide a convincing 
rationale for why unanimous actual consent (which is a tremendously stronger 
requirement) is needed to defend the mother-state’s claim to territory in the first place. In 
other words, why should not the mother-state also enjoy the more lenient requirement of 
majoritarianism? Allen Buchanan hits the nail on the head, I believe, when he puts the 
point as follows: 
 
Either the requirement of consent is taken at face value and applied consistently to the secessionist 
plebiscite itself, in which case the view is of no practical consequence because secession will virtually 
always be blocked by dissenting votes, or the requirement of unanimous consent is relaxed for the 
population of the subregion though not for the population of the state as a whole, but without any 
explanation of why this is so. […] [I]f lack of consent is acceptable [in the subregion], why not also in the 
original state? (2003: 254).  
 
In fairness to Wellman we must add that he includes a notion (which he adopts from 
Harry Beran) of a reiterated use of the majority principle. The idea behind this is that  
 
there may be people within [the separatist state] who do not wish to be part of the newly independent 
state. They could show, by majority vote within their territory, that this is so, and then become 
  
70 
independent in turn, or remain within the state from which the others wish to secede. This use of the 
majority principle may be continued until it is applied to a single community (i.e. a community which is 
not composed of a number of communities) to determine its political status (Beran 1998: 38-9, quoted in 
Wellman 2005: 60). 
 
In other words, new referenda should be held to endow all groups with the same 
(permissive) right to political self-determination. Note that an implicit idea here seems to 
be that group A is justified in coercing group B into a non-consensual secession from 
group C as long as B is also granted the right to freely associate with A or not to do so, in a 
succeeding vote. But is this sufficient to remedy Wellman’s apparently implausible 
intermingling of one partially voluntaristic and one in-practicality-less-than-partially-
voluntaristic model of justification? 
On my reading, implicit in Wellman’s theory is the following suggestion: As long 
as a state contains secessionist groups that are willing, and equally important, able to mend 
for themselves through sovereign statehood, then secession becomes morally justified. 
Perhaps this containment-of-groups-with-ability-condition could function as a sufficient 
rationale for justifying differential treatment between contexts? Call this rationale (R). 
 On the face of it, R clearly has the potential for reasonably explaining why 
unanimous consent is required when assessing the justification of the mother-state: If a 
polity contains able and willing parties, then those groups should not have their political 
liberty infringed upon by a majority vote against secession. On the contrary, secession 
should be carried out, and, crucially, the decision to secede can be taken on the basis of a 
majority vote within the secessionist territory. Still adhering to R, however, the 
justification of the new separatist state would in turn be subject to the same requirement 
of unanimous consent. Thus, if the separatist state itself contains a group that is willing 
and able to secede, then the process starts all over again: The separatist state, which is 
now the new mother-state, gets its justification thwarted when confronted with a majority 
vote for secession in the territory of the new secessionist group. The process stops when 
a new independent state no longer faces secessionist groups that are able to govern in 
legitimate fashion. In light of this, R seems to render (more) consistent the alternation 
between requiring full consensus or only (simple) majorities to obtain justification.  
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R is not without its problems. Allen Buchanan (1997) has issued an especially 
powerful critique. He focuses on the implausibility of R (and the whole theory of 
secession that accompanies it) when it faces the task of institutionalising the right to secede 
into international law. Buchanan’s point is that recognition of a Choice-right to unilateral 
secession (such as found in the argument of Wellman) would create a state of affairs in 
which governments would get (perverse) incentives to oppose various forms of intra-state 
autonomy arrangements, simply because such arrangements would obviously render 
prospective secessionists more capable of providing the legitimising functions of a state.  
I find Buchanan’s critique both strong and to the point, and indeed capable of 
significantly weakening Wellman’s theory, and other similar versions of Choice-theory, 
and perhaps inflict mortal wounds upon them22. I will nevertheless leave it aside here, as it 
is not for this essay to provide an exhaustive assessment of R. I will now briefly consider 
another of its problematic sides.  
On my reading, R implicitly assumes that the reiterated use of the majority 
principle helps remedy the harm done to the political liberty of the nonsecessionists, who 
after all are coerced into secession through a majority vote. To reiterate, the secession is 
morally more palpable as long as the coerced minority (in turn) gets its own say. This misses 
an important point, however. For one’s say to be meaningful in the topical context one 
must have a real choice. That is, one must vote over viable alternatives. Call this premise 
(a). In addition, R also seems to assume that (b) the nonsecessionists have a preference 
for a state of their own. 
Consider premise (b). Obviously, it is difficult to accommodate the preferences of 
the nonsecessionists if (1) they prefer to remain affiliated with the mother state, and (2) 
the territory they inhabit are not located in close (or perfect) vicinity of the territory of the 
post-secession mother state. Condition (2) might also come in a more complicated 
version, namely, if (2*) the territory they inhabit is made up of separate pieces of land that 
are dispersed across the secessionist territory, and these areas are not located in close (or 
perfect) vicinity of the territory of the post-secession mother state.  
Let us now assume that the following (rather straightforward) proposition, (P), is 
true: All else being equal, a polity will be able to function better if its territory is not 
dispersed in separate pieces of land. A possible exception to this is the case of separate 
                                                 
22 But see also Wellman’s response to Buchanan’s critique (in Wellman 2005: Chapter 7). 
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pieces of land that are either located within territorial waters or divided by international 
waters. The point is that intra-state affairs are allowed to pass smoothly23.  
On the face of it, given P, it seems warranted that the prospects for successful 
affiliation with the mother state (and thus, for the plebiscite among the nonsecessionists 
to in fact constitute a real choice between viable alternatives) would be better in (2) than in 
(2*). In either case, however, it will remain an empirical question whether or not 
successful affiliation with the mother state is a real option. And if such affiliation is not 
possible (which is, I think, by far the most plausible situation) then perhaps the case for 
the initial secession should be regarded as weakened. This is so because the 
nonsecessionists at “the end of the line” of one or more votes on secession will not be 
rectified by yet another application of the majority principle in their own case, simply 
because they will not be given a real choice between viable alternatives. Premise (a) falters. 
Instead they have no other alternative than to remain in the separatist state that was 
coerced upon them in the previous secessionist vote. Their individual right to political 
liberty will thus be violated.  
Against this backdrop, it seems reasonable to advance a point made by Alan 
Patten: When it is impossible to arrange boundary matters in a way that circumvents 
having to bereave the nonsecessionists of their preferred association, then it might be the 
best solution to retain the initial secessionists within the mother state. Instead, the intra-
state autonomy of the secessionists should be improved. This will provide them with an 
enhanced self-rule identity, while the nonsecessionists can simultaneously keep their 
preferred (statewide) identity. This is so, because, generally speaking,  
 
a distribution in which all get some of what they want should be regarded as superior to one in which a 
majority gets all of what they want while the minority get none. And where this is true, a closer 
approximation to the ideal would seek to give everyone some degree of membership in their preferred 
association (Patten 2002: 579). 
 
I find this principle congenial. Patten is also right when he points out that a clear asset of 
intra-state autonomy arrangements is their potential for approximating the realisation of 
that principle. 
                                                 
23 As Wellman himself acknowledges, states are territorially defined for good reasons, as their functional 
performance is crucially dependent upon this feature. (Cf. also Section 2.4 above.) 
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 When we are now sensitive to this point, it should be more apparent that 
Wellman’s theory is prone for rejection. It is simply excessively permissive to allow for 
secession by way of a majority vote in the secessionist territory. There will always be 
nonsecessionists residing on that territory, and they have a legitimate interest in 
maintaining ‘membership in their preferred association’ (which is generally the mother-
state). 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Wellman’s theory of secession endorses a hybrid model of justification. This enables him 
to largely satisfy the first part of the Tension-Requirement. However, to fulfil the second 
part of that requirement (and thus outperform the Just-Cause approach), his theory must 
be able to demonstrate that a liberal model of justified political power should incorporate 
voluntaristic elements. His theory entails two attempts to that effect. The first fails. The 
second is incomplete, and can thus be strongly challenged.  
His approach does pose one serious threat to Just-Cause theory, however. The 
balancing effect that stems from his hybrid model of justification dismantles the initial 
case for interpreting individual political liberty as vindicating intra-state autonomy 
arrangements only. The Just-Cause theorist is therefore forced to invoke a different 
rationale to sustain that latter assertion. This can be done, however, by invoking the 
argument from ‘securing the legitimate interests of the nonsecessionists’.  
 For those not yet convinced: In the next chapter I will pick up the thread and 
develop a novel argument against secession that reinforces the case for a modest 
interpretation of individual political liberty. 
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A central lesson of Chapter 2 was that liberal egalitarianism is committed to liberty in two 
senses: One must ensure both negative and positive freedom. One of the tasks I will 
undertake in this chapter is to say more on the issue of blending proportions. I will start 
out with arguing that liberal morality, in order to honour its philosophical linkage to the 
Enlightenment, must assign considerable importance to positive liberty. Thus, so-called 
competency-rights – which enhance an individual’s ability to scrutinize the value of her 
current goals and commitments – must be accorded a prominent place in a proper set of 
rights and liberties. I will further argue that societal pluralism has the potential for 
contributing to such enhancement (or what I will interchangeably refer to as facilitation of 
individual competency). When combined with a Lockean notion, which holds that 
curtailment of individual liberties are morally forbidden, these assertions will yield a novel 
argument against secession, the argument from plurality. If valid, this argument adds leverage 
to the liberal case for interpreting the principle of individual political liberty as vindicating 
intra-state autonomy arrangements only. 
 
5.1 Retaining the Enlightenment Spirit: A Progressive Liberalism 
The political philosophy of liberalism has clear intellectual connections to the period that 
spans from the late seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth, in various (mostly 
European) countries. This time is often referred to as ‘the Age of Reason’, or ‘the 
Enlightenment’. On Jeremy Waldron’s view, the relationship between liberalism and the 
Enlightenment “cannot be stressed too strongly” (1987: 134). Others have described the 
former as an “heir” of the latter (Halberstam 1998: 462) or as its “principal political 
theory” (Bronner 2004: 41). However, scholars differ as to whether the Enlightenment 
should be viewed as a unitary movement or rather as “a series of debates, which 
necessarily took different shapes and forms in particular national and cultural contexts” 
(Outram 1995: 3). This notwithstanding, according to Dorinda Outram (who resides with 
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the latter position), most can agree that the Enlightenment was “a critical enterprise, 
committed to engagement with actuality” (ibid.: 4).  
In a recent contribution, Stephen Eric Bronner (2004) is concerned with 
identifying common ground. Leaning towards the unitary position, he seeks to define 
what he refers to as the “spirit” of the Enlightenment: 
 
Just as Montesquieu believed it was the spirit of the laws, rather than any system of laws, that manifested 
the commitment to justice, the spirit of Enlightenment projected the radical quality of that commitment 
and a critique of the historical limitations with which even its best thinkers are always tainted. Empiricists 
may deny the existence of a “spirit of the times”. Nevertheless, historical epochs can generate an ethos, an 
existential stance toward reality, or what might even be termed a “project” uniting the diverse participants 
in a broader intellectual trend or movement (ibid.: 4).  
 
Albeit emphasizing that his approach implies bracketing together “a loose assemblage of 
intellectuals” (ibid.: 15-6), on Bronner’s view, “what unified them made the cumulative 
impact of individual thinkers and national intellectual trends far greater than the sum of 
their parts” (ibid.: 11). Therefore, the Enlightenment should be presented as “an 
overarching political enterprise and a living tradition” (ibid.: 16). In my brief outline I will 
adopt that kind of approach. I thereby endorse Bronner’s claim that the Enlightenment 
should be viewed “less as a dead historical artifact than as the necessary precondition for 
developing any form of progressive politics in the present” (ibid.: 10). 
The spirit of the Enlightenment was emancipatory, in the sense that it viewed 
society as an artifact. This refers to the belief that no social arrangement is beyond the 
grasp of human engineering: The world can be changed, and individuals have the right to 
change it (Bronner 2004: 34). But to be able to transform one’s social surroundings, one 
must also understand them. Marked optimism about the latter possibility was another 
central characteristic of ‘the Age of Reason’. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, 
 
The Enlightenment was characterized by a burgeoning confidence in the human ability to make sense of 
the world, to grasp its regularities and fundamental principles, and to manipulate its powers for the benefit 
of mankind. […] The drive for individual understanding of the world is matched […] by an optimism at 
least as strong about the possibility of understanding society. In one aspect, this optimism is the basis of 
modern sociology, history and economics. But it is also the source of certain normative attitudes – I want 
to say distinctively liberal attitudes – towards political and social justification. It is the source of an 
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impatience with tradition, mystery, awe and superstition as the basis of order, and of a determination to 
make authority answer at the tribunal of reason and convince us that it is entitled to respect (1987: 134). 
 
As seen earlier, these ideas lay the ground for liberalism’s (consent-based) approach to the 
justification of political power. For our purposes in this chapter, however, it is more 
important to focus on the Enlightenment’s notion of progress, which is implicitly alluded to 
in Waldron’s quote.  
To the thinkers of the Enlightenment, progress was about bringing light to “what 
had once been shrouded in darkness”. Its content was the enhancement of individual 
moral autonomy and the critical use of reason. Progress was thus linked to “the extension 
of freedom and the exercise of the intellect” (Bronner 2004: 19-20). It is important to add 
right away that the concept does not entail an assumption of absolute truths. It is not about 
a journey towards some ultimate end. Instead progress is viewed as a continuous and 
never-ending critique of the current truths. It is what Bronner calls a “regulative ideal”. 
Thus, the issue for the Enlightenment thinkers was “the establishment of conditions in 
which truth might be pursued” (ibid.: 21-2, 29). Indeed: There has been a “widespread 
notion”, writes Peter Gay, “that Enlightenment philosophers believed in the inevitability 
of progress”. But this is only a myth, which overlooks one important distinction: 
 
when we speak of “progress” we can mean either that progress is possible if we act in certain specified 
ways (if, for example, we bring our reason and our experience to bear on a social problem), or that 
progress is inevitable, inherent in history. Only the latter can properly be called a theory of progress – the 
former is the mood that lies at the bottom of reformism. But it was precisely the reformist, not the 
metaphysical, conception of progress that dominated Enlightenment thought (1954: 379-80). 
 
And here we have arrived at a paramount connection between the legacy of the 
Enlightenment and liberal egalitarian morality: To be able to honour the emancipatory 
credentials of the former, the latter must ensure that its set of liberties include rights that 
serve to facilitate individual competency. Put differently, the notion of progress must be 
retained by securing the conditions for critical scrutiny, on the part of each citizen, of the 
traditions and values that are currently established in society. We recognize this as the 
crucial content of positive freedom (cf. Chapter 2). 
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 So, progress is dependent upon questioning the legitimacy of different spheres of 
tradition, such as the family, civil society, state, and culture. A central premise is the idea 
that sociological variables can have profound impact on individuals: As Bronner puts it, 
“[o]nce differences [between individuals] were understood in sociological rather than 
religious or racial terms [it was believed to be] possible to better the lot of the most 
victimized” (2004: 35). Obviously, this further entrenches the connection between the 
Enlightenment ideal of emancipation and the requirement of competency for true 
freedom.  
Moreover, the questioning must never stop. The liberal egalitarian can never be 
completely content with her current society. Her commitment to positive freedom and 
the accompanying notion of progress requires her to secure favourable conditions for 
continuous critical scrutiny. This alone makes further progress possible (ibid.). Adherents to 
liberal egalitarianism must be aware of the restrictions that are inevitably imposed on 
them by the perspectives of their own time. Therefore, holds Bronner, 
 
[p]rogress requires situating the individual within a context and fostering the ability to discriminate 
between those constraints that are necessary and those that are not: the implicit injunction to contest 
atavistic restraints on personal freedom is precisely what renders progress “political.” (ibid.: 37).   
 
To be more concrete: Recall from Chapter 2 that the liberal egalitarian commitment to 
competency is a commitment to equalize unchosen material and natural endowments. 
This idea is clearly resonant with the thinkers of the Enlightenment. They regarded such 
gaps in resource allocations (e.g. regarding economic means) as important sources for 
differences in freedom between individuals. An “equality of life chances” became a 
pivotal objective. Thus, the spirit of the Enlightenment calls into question the purely 
formal account of freedom conveyed by the champions of strict negative liberty (Bronner 
2004: 29, 47, 55).  
It is interesting to view this in relation to assertions made in Power, the concise yet 
famous work by sociologist Steven Lukes. According to Lukes, an adequate conception of 




A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises 
power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is not the supreme exercise 
of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is, to secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? One does not have to go to the lengths of talking 
about Brave New World, or the world of B. F. Skinner, to see this: thought control takes many less total and 
more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the mass media and through the 
processes of socialisation (1980: 23). 
 
I think Lukes is right. What’s more, his assertion sheds important light on the necessity of 
crucially attending to positive liberty, that is, to ensure facilitation of individual 
competency. Thus, the connection between liberal egalitarianism and the Enlightenment 
(with the latter’s notions of emancipation and the conditions for progress) is even further 
elucidated.  
To sum up, the upshot of this section is as follows: Competency is required for 
true freedom; the ideal of emancipation is central to the Enlightenment, whose spirit must 
fill any progressive political theory; to honour that spirit, liberal egalitarianism is 
committed to give competency-rights a prominent place in a satisfactory set of rights and 
liberties. 
 
5.2 The Value of Societal Pluralism 
If I was on target in the preceding section, then liberal egalitarianism must be markedly 
concerned with securing rights and liberties that facilitate individual competency. To 
briefly recapitulate from Chapter 2: Competency-rights are supposed to better the 
conditions for intelligent choice on the part of the individual citizen regarding her goals 
and life projects. Crucially, her choice is competent only insofar as it is taken with 
awareness of alternative views about the good life. Moreover, her choice should be 
regarded as continuous in nature. She must be endowed with conditions that facilitate re-
examination of her current conception of what the good life consists in. Therefore, the 
liberal society takes great care to ensure a free flow of information: The press is free, as 
well as artistic and political expression, etc. The underlying idea seems to be that this will 
result in a society that displays a wide range of different views and conceptions of the good 
life. And further, that this diversity in turn will aid each citizen in her (continuous) process 
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of evaluating various conceptions of the good life (including her own), and choosing 
between those conceptions. I will call this the diversity-thesis, D.  
If D is correct, then, to favour intra-state autonomy arrangements over inter-state 
ones as a solution to secessionist conflicts, can be regarded as a radical way of facilitating 
competent choice. This proposition is in need of further elaboration, but as this chapter 
unfolds it will eventually enter into the contra-secession argument from plurality. In this 
section I will briefly explore the descriptive premises of that argument. 
 
5.2.1 Providing Diversity 
D is a two-fold assertion. The first part is simple: Maintaining societal diversity, rather 
than reducing it, will result in more encounters between people who adhere to a wider range 
of beliefs about the good. It strikes me as sensible to assume that, as co-citizens, people 
will naturally engage in a higher number as well as a wider range of encounters. When 
international borders divide people, then various practical conditions yield a reduction in 
both planned and random interaction. I do not intend to ground this assertion any further 
here. I will assume, all else being equal, that maintaining intra-state diversity will result in 
more frequent as well as more varied encounters, than in the case of an inter-state 
solution to the secessionist conflict. This move should not spur widespread protest. The 
more tricky part is what follows.   
 
5.2.2 Drawing Benefits from Diversity   
The second part of D is less clear-cut than the first. This is so because diversity is not 
valuable in the relevant sense unless it actually helps people to broaden their horizon. 
Societal pluralism must prove beneficial to an individual’s process of choosing and re-
examining her conception of the good: Diversity must facilitate competency. What does 
this amount to?  
On my reading, the ‘awareness of different views about the good life’, which is a 
central notion in Kymlicka’s outline of competency rights (cf. 2.3), entails assessing those 
alternative outlooks in a fair, rational, and unbiased way. An encounter between person A 
and person B will not be constructive as long as A, B, or both, come to the “meeting” 
with a biased way of perceiving the other person’s outlook and commitments, and that 
this bias persists despite of the encounter. If so, societal diversity has not facilitated 
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competent choice. Even though it may have raised the probability of an encounter in the 
first place, a beneficial outcome in the relevant sense is contingent upon a certain level of 
open-mindedness in the meeting situation. Can societal diversity be of help in this respect? I 
will now briefly address a couple of hypotheses about the prospects of achieving a 
facilitation of competency. 
I begin with the bad news. Ethnocentrism may be a powerful and perilous force to 
reckon with. The point is that such chauvinism may distort our perception. It may yield 
wrong assessments of the potentially palpable (or impalpable) features of other people’s 
commitments and traditions. Whether one approves of another person’s customs and 
conceptions or not, the important thing for competency is that we get our perceptions right. 
Unfortunately, however, well-established psychological theory points to a human 
tendency to stereotype other persons. This disposition is linked to characteristics of our 
perception and our processing of information. Following Atkinson et al.: 
 
Whenever we perceive any object or event, we compare the incoming information with memories of 
previous encounters with similar objects and events. […] [M]emories of objects and events are not usually 
photographlike reproductions of the original stimuli but simplified reconstructions of our original 
perceptions. […] [S]uch representations or memory structures are called schemas; they are organized beliefs 
and knowledge about people, objects, events, and situations. The process of searching in memory for the schema 




Schematic processing typically occurs rapidly and automatically. […] Without schemas and schematic 
processing we would be overwhelmed by the information that inundates us. […] But the price we pay for 
such efficiency is a bias in both our perception and our memories of the data (ibid.: 609). 
 
Such biases and mistakes serve to entrench stereotypes and make them very persistent. In 
fact, in addition to selectively diverting our attention to stimuli that confirm our 
stereotypes, we also distort our perception of data that would disconfirm them (ibid.: 613-
4).  
Given these psychological predispositions, it may be natural to make the simple 
assumption that it is easier to approach alternative conceptions of the good with an open 
  
81
mind if the persons who pursue them are not perceived as foreigners. At least, abstractly 
speaking: If more borders and obstacles are erected between “us and them”, then it is 
easier to be hostile (and thus less receptive) towards other ways of life. Accordingly, on 
the face of it, it might seem the better alternative to maintain diversity within the current 
state. 
Here one might object that it is not state borders that may create hostility, but rather 
the content of the different outlooks on life. Call this objection X. Now, how well founded 
is X? Indirect validation is provided by studies of a somewhat related issue, namely the 
prospects of having immigrants adapting to the cultural orientation of their new country. 
It is suggested that “[d]istance between cultural orientations may have an influence; the 
greater the cultural differences, the less positive is the adaptation” (Bierbrauer & Pedersen 
1996: 416).  
Now let us imagine the following: As an “average” Norwegian (whatever that may 
signify) I may be more hostile to the philosophy of life belonging to an “average” person 
of Somali heritage (again, whatever that may signify) even if she is living in my hometown, 
than towards that of a Swede – or any other individual who happen to share most of my 
Norwegian conceptions of what the good life consists in (consumerism, cross-country 
skiing, brown cheese (on reflection, probably unique to Norwegians!), and what have you) 
– who lives abroad. I concede that this is a reasonable objection to make. But it does not 
really threaten the initial assumption. Even though one recognizes X, it is not inconsistent 
to also claim that (Y) I will be more receptive to the outlook of my Somali co-citizen when 
she lives in my hometown, than if I was never personally exposed to her ways of life at all. 
So, all else equal, living in societal proximity may nevertheless enhance a person’s 
receptiveness towards alternative conceptions of the good life.  
However, the persistent critic may still object that intimate interaction with 
“distant” ways of life will not always have the effect that I ascribe to it. Instead, she may 
hold, the opposite will prevail: Close contact between Norwegians and Somalis will 
cement (in an irrational manner) their respective initial conceptions of the good. Again, 
the idea is that the tendency to stereotype can be expected to throw a spanner into the 
works. 
Obviously, people are different. They may vary greatly, both in their ability to, as 
well as in their motivation (or the lack of such) for exploring different conceptions of the 
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good life. Note, however, that the value of societal pluralism is not dependent upon the 
possibility of turning each individual into a “xenophile”, an “adventure-machine” who 
constantly craves to explore other ways of life. This will not, and need not, be the case. In 
fact, when viewed in isolation, the only requirement for favouring intra- over inter-state 
autonomy is that the former does a better job of enhancing competent choice than the 
latter. And even though the prospects of constructive encounters are poorer when 
conceptions of the good are correspondingly more divergent, there is evidence that the 
perils of ethnocentrism need not prevail as long as certain conditions for constructive 
encounters are in place. As we will now see, in the case of liberal-to-liberal secession the 
chances of meeting those conditions are not at all dim.  
The contact hypothesis holds that “sheer contact between two groups is enough to 
remove hostile attitudes to one another”. Certain contextual hallmarks are needed, 
however, to secure that beneficial result. These conditions include “equal status, co-
operation and some degree of intimacy” (Argyle 1994: 194-5). For some groups, such as 
immigrants, these conditions are rarely met. Immigrants are often poor in socio-economic 
terms. They are not (immediately) awarded equal citizenship rights. And geographically 
they are often concentrated rather than dispersed, which obviously reduces their amount 
of intimate encounters with nonimmigrants. Taken together these characteristics make a 
poor case for fulfilling the conditions of the contact hypothesis.  
Unlike in the case of low-status immigrants, however, it seems plausible to assume 
that the members of the secessionist group will not be subject to uniform status 
attribution. Recall that I only consider well-established and well-functioning liberal 
democratic welfare states. In such cases it is very likely that the secessionists are, as their 
co-citizens alike, heterogeneous rather than homogenous on a range of variables that 
determine status, such as socio-economic measures. Further, the members of the group 
obviously enjoy equal citizenship rights, with all the benefits (e.g. welfare contributions) 
and burdens (i.e. paying taxes) that involves. And while immigrants often are naturally in a 
position in which they become net-benefactors from redistributive policies, it is 
straightforward to assume that the secessionists contribute to, and benefit from, the 
welfare “project” on a par with other groups in society. Thus, the negative stereotypes 
that often cling to immigrants (“they are welfare-state parasites”) will presumably be 
harder to cast on the members of the secessionist group. Further, as far as contributing to 
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the maintenance of public redistributive institutions can be seen as a vital cooperative 
endeavour, then, the condition of cooperation is in that sense also in place. If the contact 
hypothesis is correct, one may thus expect a fortunate state of things concerning hostility 
levels. The last variable, the condition of intimacy, will vary according to the secessionists’ 
degree of geographical dispersal.  
Before I proceed, let me address an objection that might have arisen in response to 
what I have just said in the previous paragraph. One might object that a central 
assumption – that secessionists will not be stereotyped as welfare-state parasites simply 
because they are not – fails to take into account a point that I made earlier, namely, that the 
process of stereotyping is irrational. I concede that this may reduce the probability of 
achieving competency-facilitation. It is obviously not given that the other groups in 
society will carefully attend to the factual evidence before venturing their judgment of the 
secessionists. On the contrary, in light of the human tendency to rely on irrational 
processes of belief-formation, the opposite may be regarded as more probable. But, again, 
I would like to counter this with the claim that the conditions for sorting out the mistakes 
which we potentially make when perceiving our surroundings, will nevertheless be better 
with an intra-state solution to the secessionist conflict. Erecting more barriers between 
groups will not prove beneficial in this respect. Our psychological predispositions will not 
disappear by redrawing territorial boundaries.  
Related to this, it is natural to assume that the secessionist conflict itself may have 
created raised hostility levels and facilitated stereotyped perceptions of “the others”. But, 
again, it strikes me as sensible that the prospects of getting our perceptions right will still 
be brighter under conditions of maintained pluralism, in which the possibilities for 
communication between group members will be as ample as possible. To use a metaphor, 
the norm for reacting to diplomatic crises between sovereign states, namely to withdraw 
one’s ambassadors, is paradoxical. Albeit largely a symbolic act, when levels of conflict are 
high, it is indeed counter-constructive to sever channels of communication. Now, let me 
call attention to one additional point, which may serve, I believe, to further substantiate 
my assertions here. 
The liberal state is well established. The groupings it contains have lived together 
over a significant period of time. It is therefore plausible to assume that the secessionists, 
on a par with other citizens, are experienced interpreters of, and contributors to, the 
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cultural codes of conduct and communication utilized in society. An important source of 
conflict is thereby diverted from the scene. As Michael Argyle writes,  
 
[w]hen people from different cultures meet, there is infinite scope for misunderstandings and confusion. 
This may be a matter of misinterpreting the other’s communications, verbal or nonverbal. […] The result 
of these cross-cultural misunderstandings is likely to be that each person rejects the other as one who has 
failed to conform to the standards of civilized society, and regards him as impossible to get on with (1994: 
195-6). 
 
Not the best basis, you would say, for a constructive encounter in which both parties can 
fairly assess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective conceptions of the good? I 
agree. Luckily, then, this unfortunate situation does not to any great extent haunt the case 
of liberal-to-liberal secession. This is so for the following reason: In such contexts, the 
negative influence of X will be significantly reduced because the secessionists themselves 
share with their current co-citizens (important parts of) a liberal outlook on life. For 
instance, both groups recognize liberal individual rights. And, crucially, such similarities 
are more easily communicated by virtue of those very similarities. 
Obviously, in the case of such convergence in beliefs, the argument from plurality 
may seem to be (i) somewhat less relevant for our purposes; but, at the same time, the 
convergence also (ii) helps validate the argument’s descriptive premises. The mild 
“paradox” of this situation is eased if one concedes that (i) does not apply in cases where 
the secessionists adhere to crucial liberal principles, but at the same time possess some 
cultural traits that are significantly different in important ways from that of the other 
citizens. Examples of this abound. Consider for instance the Catholics of Northern 
Ireland in Great Britain (religion), the Catalans and Basques in Spain (language), and the 
Quebecois of Canada (language). None of these groups, I think, can reasonably be said to 
differ from their co-citizens on questions about, for example, the commitment to liberal 
democratic rule. They nevertheless contribute markedly to societal diversity through their 
alternative religious faith and bilingualism. In addition to such heavily exposed 
differences, the secessionist groups will probably display a range of more subdued ones as 
well, such as variations in cuisine, folklore, etc.   
 This survey of psychological theory has admittedly been brief. A note of caution is 
appropriate. It is not my task here to authoritatively settle the empirical question of 
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whether societal diversity will enhance people’s ability to examine and revise their own 
current conception of the good life. That job is obviously better suited for psychologists 
and sociologists. Thomas F. Pettigrew (2004: 232-8) lists several challenges that the 
discipline of social psychology should solve before its research can be soundly translated 
into policy influencing prescriptions that are universal in scope. Prime among these are 
problems of external validity (‘the laboratory versus the “real world” issue’); the question 
of whether policy applications can show cross-cultural and cross-societal consistency; and 
the current fact that “[s]ocial psychology is largely an inductive, empirically driven 
science” (ibid.: 232). These challenges suggest the need for a careful case-to-case 
approach when one determines the validity of the diversity-thesis. In other words, the 
value of societal pluralism should be assessed separately in each particular case. 
Moral reasoning must be sensitive to its use of descriptive premises. I therefore 
take the liberty to be first in emphasizing that the force of the normative argument from 
plurality is contingent upon the validity of the proposition I have just advanced in this 
section. I will proceed, however, under the assumption that societal pluralism facilitates 
competent choice, and that it must thus be regarded as a ‘competency-right’. 
 
5.3 John Locke’s Two Arguments for Restrictions on Freedom of Choice 
I will now develop the last part of the argument from plurality. We have thus far seen that 
liberal egalitarian morality must be markedly concerned with endowing people with rights 
and liberties that facilitate competency. The preceding section demonstrated that societal 
pluralism constitutes such a competency-right. The proposition of this section will be that 
liberal morality should not allow for curtailment of rights and liberties. As Raino Malnes (1988) has 
persuasively argued, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government can be interpreted as 
providing two arguments for such a normative statement.  
There are two Lockean arguments for restrictions on individual freedom of choice. 
The first stems from the necessity of taking into consideration the autonomy of other 
individuals. It refers to other-regarding restrictions on individual freedom. Following Malnes: 
 
It is not implied in the image of human beings as self-determining agents that they are free to define and 
pursue goals at their own discretion. Locke never intends freedom of action to license every conceivable 
course of action in any area. […] A right that is grounded in the value of rational agents living by the light 
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of their own convictions cannot consistently permit anyone to encroach upon the autonomy of others. It 
is a restricted right – restricted by the requirement not to prevent other people from exercising the same 
right (1988: 78-9). 
 
The argument for other-regarding restrictions on personal freedom can be easily 
translated into an argument for similar restrictions on public choice, that is, popular 
sovereignty. Writes Malnes, 
 
Locke restricts popular sovereignty so as to dismiss as illegitimate constitutional terms which curtail 
personal and political liberties. […] It implies, in practical terms, that people are not permitted to deprive 
some of their number of freedom, no matter how popular this may be among segments of the population 
that, e.g., benefit materially from the subjection of others (ibid.: 80).   
 
It is interesting to note that this accords well with the liberal egalitarian idea of fixed 
standards of good government, which has thus far vindicated a Just-Cause approach to 
secession. 
The second argument for restrictions on freedom is self-regarding. This argument is 
invoked to circumvent that a person can be morally justified in voluntarily curtailing her 
own rights and liberties. As Malnes puts it, Locke’s solution is to hold that an individual’s  
 
right of natural freedom [implies] not just a requirement not to transgress on other people’s enjoyment of 
the same right. […] It [also] involves […] an obligation not to alienate, or otherwise act so as to 
jeopardize, one’s personal liberties. Thus it is no more permissible not to respect oneself as an agent 
capable of self-determination, than it is to thwart the potentialities of another (ibid.: 81). 
 
This second argument for restrictions on freedom of choice implies an understanding of 
freedom as ‘continuing’ freedom. A person is free in the continuing sense “if the same 
(manifold) options lie open to him (morally speaking) at every moment of his life, so that 
he has no second-order option to remove any alternative from the feasible set”. ‘Self-
embracing’ freedom, however, encompasses the opportunity to voluntarily renounce parts 
of the same freedom (ibid.: 83). (Cf. also Section 2.5 above.) 
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 This brief outline should suffice to establish the Lockean case against curtailment 
of the rights and liberties of individuals. We are now able to wind up the three 
propositions that will yield the contra-secession argument from plurality: 
 
(i) Competency-rights are crucial in a proper set of rights and liberties; 
(ii) societal pluralism is a competency-right; 
(iii) no curtailment of rights and liberties is allowed; therefore, 
(iv) societal pluralism should not be curtailed. 
 
Put differently, a liberal egalitarian theory of secession must take into account the value of 
societal pluralism. The commitment to positive freedom helps to single out and ground a 
novel argument against secession. If separation will yield a reduction in societal diversity, 
then liberal egalitarians will prefer an intra-state solution to the secessionist conflict. How 
cogent is the contra-secession argument from plurality? Let me address some possible 
objections. 
On Malnes’s view, it is only Locke’s first argument for restrictions on personal 
freedom that is convincing. The second is not. It is far from evident, he writes, that 
Locke’s resort to understanding freedom as continuing is warranted. If not, the argument 
for self-regarding restrictions on freedom of choice fails to constitute a proper solution to 
the problem of circumventing voluntary renunciations of rights and liberties (Malnes 
1988: 83). Malnes does not, however, provide any rationale that can substantiate his 
assertion. And even though I am tempted to argue that Locke’s second argument may 
fare a bit better than Malnes claims, I will leave that discussion aside here. The reason is 
simple: As I will now demonstrate, the force of the argument from plurality can be 
developed from both arguments. Its cogency is not, however, dependent upon the two in 
concert. Let us assume that Malnes’s rejection of Locke’s second argument is correct. The 
argument from plurality can nevertheless rely on the other-regarding restrictions on 
personal freedom. What is the rationale behind this? 
It is a paternalistic element in the argument from plurality: It tells the secessionists 
(and the nonsecessionists) that, all else equal, they will be better off with their current 
plural society than with a split into two more homogenous polities. This paternalism can 
be hard (i.e. to act on behalf of the interests of competent agents, but against their will) or 
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soft (i.e. to act on behalf of the interests of noncompetent agents, such as the children of 
competent agents, or future generations).  
The first type of paternalism can be warranted if Locke’s second argument is 
sound: The secessionists are not morally allowed to secede because this would reduce 
societal pluralism, and thus amount to a curtailment of their own competency-right to 
diversity. The soft version of paternalism, on the other hand, can be justified by 
grounding it in the (less radical) first argument: The secessionists are not morally allowed 
to secede because this would reduce societal pluralism, and thus amount to a curtailment 
of their children’s (and future generation’s) competency-right to diversity.  
So, even if the strategy that makes use of hard paternalism is ruled out, the 
argument from plurality can still function well. By making paternalism soft, it relies 
instead on Locke’s other-regarding restrictions on individual freedom of choice. It is the 
regard for others – that is, noncompetent agents – that restricts the adult secessionists.  
Allen Buchanan regards (soft) state paternalism, which aims at securing the good 
of noncompetent agents, as a very strong argument against secession24. He does, 
however, qualify its application to cases where the secession would “form an illiberal 
society in which people will not be given an opportunity to make an informed and free choice 
between a liberal and an illiberal form of life. It has no force if there is freedom to exit the 
illiberal society” (1991: 101, my emphasis). This assertion is not cogent. 
Firstly, a right to exit from is indeed a shallow one if it does not entail a corresponding 
right to immigrate to. Following Kok-Chor Tan: 
 
What would be the point of [a right to emigration] if it is not reinforced by the demand that states also be 
obliged to accept immigrants? […] A right to emigrate from a country without a corresponding right to 
immigrate to a country is a facile right. In the domestic setting, even when one leaves one’s private 
association one is able to join another, even if it is the default community, as when one leaves the church 
and joins the secular community. In international society, on the other hand, one cannot leave one’s 
country unless also adopted by another country (1998: 292-3). 
                                                 
24 Let me inform that Buchanan uses the term ‘soft’ paternalism slightly different from a terminology proposed by 
Gerald Dworkin (2005). Buchanan refers to paternal restriction of adult secessionists as an act of ‘soft’ paternalism, 
as long as the restriction is done to protect the good of noncompetent agents (1991: 101, 124). That is consonant with 
my usage of the term. In Dworkin’s terminology, however, ‘soft’ paternalism refers to acts that are undertaken to 
determine the competency of an agent. If the agent is found to be acting both voluntarily and knowledgeably, then 
interference subsides (2005: Section 2). For a tour de force of the concept of paternalism, see the excellent anthology 
edited by Rolf Sartorius (1983). 
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Secondly, and more important, it is good reason to believe that an illiberal society would 
not be concerned with providing their citizens with neither (i) a liberal education nor (ii) a 
free flow of information across the state border. If so, the prospects for developing a 
sufficiently informed and competent citizenry, who could thus relevantly exercise the right 
to exit, seem dim. For this reason Buchanan’s argument is clearly deficient or even 
misplaced altogether. He clearly mentions that the choice to leave (or stay) must be 
‘informed and free’, but this is a small comfort as long as the force of the argument from 
paternalism is made wholly contingent upon the sole requirement of available exit.  
Instead, the separatist state should be required to also provide its citizenry with 
conditions that secure the establishment of sufficient competence. To put it simple, in 
that respect, what is needed is to recognize the validity of the argument from plurality.  
 
5.4 A Counter-Intuitive Implication: Restricting Consensual Secession? 
The observant reader may have noticed a potential weakness in my argument thus far. 
The problem goes as follows: The Lockean moral case against curtailment of rights and 
liberties has a counter-intuitive implication, namely, that consensual secession (cf. Section 
1.1) will also be morally impermissible. This is an important observation, and it may a 
weighty objection to the argument from plurality. The argument, in the form spelled out 
above, must therefore be regarded as tentative until it can accommodate this problem. I 
do not make reservations here, however, because I think that providing a solution will not 
be excessively difficult. My proposition in this section is that the plurality argument 
should be elaborated by including a threshold requirement for sufficient diversity. When this 
is done, the argument will accord more easily with our liberal egalitarian intuitions.  
First, let me elaborate briefly on the putative problem. It seems that the argument 
from plurality cannot allow for any actions that would bring about societal 
homogenisation, as that would imply an infringement on the individual competency-right 
to diversity. This is so because, in a sense, any reduction in societal diversity can be said to 
represent a curtailment of that right. But what if (1) the political divorce is consensual; and 
(2) the post-secession polities will experience only marginal reductions in societal diversity? 
In such cases, says the critic, the prescriptions made by the argument from plurality run 
counter to our considered judgments. To deny secession under such circumstances (in 
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which both 1 and 2 are satisfied) is counter-intuitive. It will simply amount to an 
excessively strong restriction of liberty.  
Now, if we refine the argument from plurality, by way of incorporating a threshold 
for minimal diversity, the number of such cases will be reduced. This is so because as long 
as the post-secession polities satisfy that threshold, the argument from plurality will not 
restrict secession. Is this move ad hoc? I think not. It should be clear from earlier passages 
(cf. e.g. Sections 2.3.1-2 and 4.2) that the concept of a threshold can and should be 
recognized within liberal theory. To reiterate: Reliance on various threshold concepts does 
in fact appear as downright required for the task of balancing the commitments to 
negative and positive liberty. For example, the pure rationalistic approach to political 
power retained its cogency by introducing a threshold for minimal functional 
performance. If it had failed to incorporate such a threshold, then forceful annexations of 
other liberal states could become justified. Obviously, that would have left liberal 
egalitarians with an impalpable model of political power, as well as an anemic account of 
political liberty. 
 A persistent critic may perhaps cling to that latter expression, and claim that even a 
threshold-sensitive argument from plurality will yield an anemic conception of political 
liberty. The rationale could go as follows: The competency-right that grounds the 
argument from plurality does not carry enough moral weight as to thwart the (more 
fundamental) right to political liberty. But this criticism is not well founded. It has lost out 
of sight the pivotal lessons of Chapters 3 and 4, in which it has already been shown that a 
Choice-right to secede (grounded in the principle of political liberty) is not easily 
compatible with an all-things-considered liberal egalitarian approach.  
To be precise: In Chapter 3 I argued against the pure voluntaristic model of 
political power, whereas Chapter 4 dismissed Wellman’s hybrid model. The upshot in 
both cases is nevertheless the same: Liberal egalitarianism should prefer an intra-state 
accommodation of the secessionist demands for enhanced self-rule. And the argument 
from plurality provides the Just-Cause theorist with a novel argument to that effect. 
To make it perfectly clear: Rather than single-handedly thwarting the case for a 
Choice-right to secede, the argument from plurality should be viewed, neither more nor 
less, as providing further support for an intra-state solution to the secessionist conflict. 
However, when paired up with the argument from ‘securing the legitimate interests of the 
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nonsecessionists’ (cf. 4.5), it adds substantial leverage to the liberal case for a modest 
interpretation of the principle of individual political liberty.  
 What about the remaining cases, then? For them secession is (1) consensual, but 
(2*) the post-secession polities will experience reductions in societal diversity that violate 
the threshold requirement. In these instances the argument from plurality will not allow 
separation. This cannot be circumvented. Let me emphasize, however, that my aim in this 
essay has not been to discuss cases that satisfy condition (1). We cannot rule out that that 
condition may alter the moral calculus in ways that will render (diversity-reducing) 
secession justified, even though the argument from plurality is valid. These cases deserve 
a thorough treatment of their own. But that must be a task for another occasion. This 
brief section may herald, however, that the development of a liberal theory of consensual 
secession has the potential to make up an intriguing challenge.       
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
The competency-right to diversity is only one among various liberal individual rights and 
liberties. Together they make up a certain set, which, when satisfied, pertains to establish 
the justified wielding of political power. But those rights and liberties are not on a par 
with each other. Their moral importance varies. 
This chapter has shown, however, that the right to societal diversity is not an 
insignificant right. And when awarded its rightful place in liberal egalitarian morality, it 







This essay has provided a defence of the Just-Cause approach to secession. If my 
argument has been sound, then future work in this area – when done from the 
perspective of liberal egalitarian morality – should be particularly concerned with 
developing that liberal approach. In this closing chapter I will briefly summarize some of 
the most crucial insights that have led to that proposition. 
 In so doing I will take inspiration from the following quote by Robert Nozick, in 
which he airs a view on the characteristics of works in philosophy: 
 
[T]he usual manner of presenting philosophical work puzzles me. Works of philosophy are written as 
though their authors believe them to be the absolutely final word on their subject. But it’s not, surely, that 
each philosopher thinks that he finally, thank God, has found the truth and built an impregnable fortress 
around it. We are actually much more modest than that. For good reason. Having thought long and hard 
about the view he proposes, a philosopher has a reasonably good idea about its weak points; the places 
where great intellectual weight is placed upon something perhaps too fragile to bear it, the places where 
the unravelling of the view might begin, the unprobed assumptions he feels uneasy about (1974: xii). 
 
So, to somewhat live up to that description, the findings of this essay will be summarized 
by pointing out the weak spots of each liberal perspective on secession. This 
simultaneously reveals the areas in which the partisans of each position should, as I see it, 
concentrate their future efforts. I will go through it chronologically.  
Chapters 2 and 3 gathered strong presumptive evidence in favour of the Just-
Cause approach. The pure voluntaristic model of political power was found to be quite 
weak relative to its rationalistic rival. While the former clearly honoured the commitment 
to popular sovereignty, it also implied eradicating the commitment to fixed standards of 
good government, in equally clear fashion. The rationalistic model, on the other hand, 
was able to somewhat balance both commitments (albeit by paying the (manageable) cost 
of denying the voluntaristic expression of popular sovereignty). This vindicated Just-
Cause theory as the proper liberal approach to secession.  
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Still and all, in Chapter 4 that presumption faltered. We saw that Wellman’s 
Choice-theory, with its hybrid model of political power, constituted a substantial challenge 
to the partisans of the Just-Cause approach. No longer could they invoke the persuasive 
argument from the necessity of balancing the incongruous commitments of liberal 
morality (cf. the Tension-Requirement): Its rival could (if not in a more elegant fashion) 
venture a somewhat equally plausible way of accommodating both of the topical liberal 
commitments. (Note, however, that in order to get that result, the most radical version of 
Choice-theory – which incorporates the pure voluntaristic approach to political power – 
had to be abandoned.) 
 Here we have arrived at a weak spot of the Just-Cause approach. The strategy that 
convincingly invalidated the pure voluntaristic model of political power does not hit 
Wellman’s theory a mortal blow. To vindicate their perspective the partisans of Just-
Cause theory must therefore have recourse to other liberal egalitarian rationales. A new 
possible strategy is to specify the content of the standards of good government. That is, 
one demonstrates what a proper set of liberal rights and liberties amounts to, and how 
these crucial aspects of a good governmental order will be infringed upon in Wellman’s 
Choice-theory. For the sake of simplicity, let us refer to this as the strategy of specification.  
I find that strategy to be promising. I have therefore provided two arguments in 
accordance with it: Chapter 4 presented the argument from ‘securing the legitimate 
interests of the nonsecessionists’; Chapter 5 developed the argument from ‘plurality’. The 
normative force of these arguments flows from the core of liberal morality: They both 
belong to a properly specified set of liberal individual rights. What’s more, if we sanction 
state breaking, then it seems virtually impossible, due to the very nature of these rights, to 
avoid infringing upon them. (A moment’s reflection will reveal the range of practical 
problems that confronts us in that latter respect. Consider, for instance, the difficulties 
involved in accommodating every group of nonsecessionists under Wellman’s theory. 
Unless the groups with different identity-preferences reside in homogenous territorial 
entities, and, further, that these entities are located in favourable vicinity to the group(s) 
with whom they want to remain affiliated, then the right of the group members – to 
maintain their identity of choice – will be violated. Further, it seems plausible to expect 
that these difficulties will increase in the face of each new decision to secede. This is so 
because each state breaking will naturally reduce the number of identities that a citizen 
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can relevantly choose to affiliate with. Similar points were discussed in Chapter 4.) Thus, 
if liberal egalitarians go for Wellman’s Choice-approach to secession, they should (by 
now) be sufficiently aware of the costs involved: Important liberal individual rights will 
have to be sacrificed.  
Note that my contribution here has been preliminary. The Just-Cause theorist 
should be concerned with developing further arguments, if attainable, in accordance with 
the strategy of specification. The logic is simple: The liberal egalitarian case against the 
Choice-approach will be reinforced for each new right that can be proved to be in 
jeopardy. 
What about Just-Cause theory? What concessions, if any, does that approach have 
to make? The strength of the Just-Cause approach is that it seems able to secure a 
comprehensive set of liberal individual rights, while also sufficiently honour the value of 
group self-determination. Let me stress the italicisation in that last sentence. It is obvious 
that intra-state autonomy arrangements permit less comprehensive group autonomy than 
does a full-fledged secession. To this I readily concede. The crucial question, however, is 
(1) why liberal egalitarian morality, in order to properly honour group autonomy, must 
grant secessionist rights. And, further: Even if a proper valuing of group self-determination 
per se in fact requires recognizing a right to secede, it is still a question of (2) what liberal 
morality – all-things-considered – should do. These points were rehearsed in Chapter 4.  
So, in order to vindicate Wellman’s Choice-theory as the best liberal approach to 
secession, its partisans must provide a satisfactory answer to both (1) and (2). I have 
argued that Wellman himself does not succeed in answering neither.  
In the absence of a plausible answer to these questions it seems (at least for the 
time being) that the Just-Cause approach is the best overall liberal egalitarian theory of secession; Just-
Cause theory seems capable of accommodating a larger number of relevant liberal 
commitments than does its rival. 
It is crucial to underline the following: The above conclusion is tentative. It may 
perfectly well be upset by future research. This essay has sought to identify some of the 
most pressing issues that remain to be convincingly addressed, or further substantiated, 
by each liberal approach to secession. It is my hope that this clarification may offer 
guidance for adherents to both liberal perspectives.  
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By emphasizing the tentative nature of my conclusion I further hope to convey a 
humble and respectful approach to a theme that incorporates some core questions of 
political philosophy. It is a virtue, I think, to force oneself to abstain from excessive 
assuredness when doing work in this field. As Raino Malnes puts it, questions in 
normative political theory are “hard”, and “it is no credit to [the field] that it affords easy 
answers to [them]” (1988: 58). 
I close with a quote that further demonstrates the appropriateness of reverence. 
To make use of Robert Nozick’s metaphorical vigour: 
 
One form of philosophical activity feels like pushing and shoving things to fit into some fixed perimeter 
of specified shape. All those things are lying out there, and they must be fit in. You push and shove the 
material into the rigid area getting it into the boundary on one side, and it bulges out on another. You run 
around and press in the protruding bulge, producing yet another in another place. So you push and shove 
and clip off corners from the things so they’ll fit and you press in until finally almost everything sits 
unstable more or less in there; what doesn’t gets heaved far away so that it won’t be noticed. […] Quickly, 
you find an angle from which it looks like an exact fit and take a snapshot; at a fast shutter speed before 
something else bulges out too noticeably. Then, back to the darkroom to touch up the rents, rips, and 
tears in the fabric of the perimeter. All that remains is to publish the photograph as a representation of 
exactly how things are, and to note how nothing fits properly into any other shape (Nozick 1974: xiii).   
 
Exaggerated? A bit too satirical, you will say? That might be so. Still, if we are honest with 
ourselves, then most of us will recognize, I think, the pertinence of Nozick’s remark. 
Therefore: Normative argumentation should always be forced on; rationales should be 
sharpened, reaffirmed, or rejected in the face of novel objections to them; we should 
welcome well-founded critique; it is a potential whetstone.  
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